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Abstract 
Risk communication is a core capacity under the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) 
International Health Regulations (2005) and an important part of modern public health practice. 
However, while international legislative frameworks set the scope of risk communication, there 
is a demand for increasing and improving evidence and skills in risk communication research, 
policy and strategy development, evaluation of practice and sustainable capacity building.   
This cumulative habilitation describes the major contributions to the field of risk 
communication in public health and health security both at a thematic, content level of risk 
communication research policy and practice and at a broader methodological level. It 
introduces the new conceptual paradigm of risk communication that moves risk 
communication from being a technical capacity to convey health risk information to a targeted 
audience to a governance approach with three strategic axes of information (gathering, 
assessing and sharing), communication (strategies, key messages and means of 
communication) and coordination (at various administrative levels). It introduces a new system 
to understand risk communication practice by providing a matrix of risk communication 
activities, such as information (listening), communication (relationship-building) and 
coordination (supportive environments) across the lifecycle of an event, e.g. outbreak, before, 
during and after. Adopting this new perspective can generate innovative insights, as 
demonstrated in the field of antimicrobial resistance. The new paradigm and its methodology 
can also support strategy development at health policy level and facilitate the assessment of 
public health security. The Marburg Biosafety and Biosecurity Scale (MBBS) is a framework 
for rational risk assessment and risk communication and offers a new metric to assess biosafety 
and biosecurity that can also guide capacity building in these areas.  
Evaluation of public health interventions is essential to monitor progress, identify and assess 
areas for improvements and demonstrate useful outcomes and overall impact. The Earlier – 
Faster – Smoother – Smarter approach is an original framework to monitor, evaluate and guide 
risk communication activities for earlier detection, faster response, smoother coordination and 
smarter legacy that were applied in two case studies (Ebola, earlier detection).  
Risk communication in public health and health security has important thematic outputs with 
significant outcomes and impact. The applied, new methodology is a social laboratory format 
that is social, experimental and systematic and has the potential to become a genuine 
methodological category. Both, content and methodological approaches, contribute to a 
!
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framework for a sustainable implementation of the new risk communication paradigm in public 
health research, policy and practice. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Risikokommunikation ist eine Kernkompetenz im Rahmen der Internationalen 
Gesundheitsvorschriften (IGV 2005) der Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) und ein 
wichtiger Teil moderner Gesundheitssysteme und öffentlicher Gesundheitspraxis. Während die 
internationale Gesetzgebung den Geltungsbereich der Risikokommunikation festlegt, besteht 
die Forderung nach mehr und besserer Evidenz und Kompetenz in der 
Risikokommunikationsforschung, ihren gesundheits- und sicherheitspolitischen 
Implikationen, der Strategieentwicklung, der Evaluation der Praxis und dem nachhaltigen 
Kapazitätenaufbau. 
Diese kumulative Habilitation beschreibt die wichtigsten Beiträge zur Risikokommunikation 
in der öffentlichen Gesundheit und Gesundheitssicherstellung sowohl auf einer thematischen, 
inhaltlichen Ebene und auf einer breiteren methodischen Ebene. Diese Arbeit stellt das neue 
Paradigma der Risikokommunikation vor, das Risikokommunikation von einer technischen 
Fähigkeit zur Vermittlung von Gesundheitsrisikoinformationen an ein Zielpublikum zu einem 
Governance-Ansatz mit drei strategischen Achsen der Information (Erfassung, Bewertung und 
gemeinsame Nutzung), Kommunikation (Strategien, Kernbotschaften, mediale Formate) und 
Koordination (auf verschiedenen Administrationsebenen) entwickelt. Sie stellt ein neues 
System vor, um die Risikokommunikationspraxis besser zu verstehen, indem es eine Matrix 
von Risikokommunikationsaktivitäten wie Information (Zuhören), Kommunikation 
(Beziehungsaufbau) und Koordination (supportive Umgebungen) über den gesamten Zeitraum 
eines Ereignisses, z.B. ein Infektionsausbruch, beschreibt (vorher, währenddessen, danach). 
Diese Perspektive kann innovative Erkenntnisse erzeugen, wie auf dem Gebiet der 
antimikrobiellen Resistenz gezeigt wird. Das neue Paradigma und seine Methodik können auch 
die Strategieentwicklung auf gesundheitspolitischer Ebene unterstützen und die Bewertung der 
Gesundheitssicherheit erleichtern. Die Marburg Biosafety and Biosecurity Scale (MBBS) ist 
ein konzeptioneller Rahmen für eine rationale Risikobewertung und Risikokommunikation und 
bietet eine neue Metrik zur Bewertung von Biosafety und Biosecurity, die auch den 
Kapazitätenaufbau in diesen Bereichen leiten kann. 
Für die Evaluierung von Interventionen im Bereich der öffentlichen Gesundheit ist von 
wesentlicher Bedeutung, die Fortschritte adäquat beurteilen zu können, sowie Bereiche für 
Verbesserungen zu identifizieren. Der Earlier-Faster-Smoother-Smarter Ansatz ist ein neuer 
Rahmen für die Evaluierung von Risikokommunikation, der zu früheren Detektion, einer 
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schnelleren Reaktion, einer besseren Koordination und wirksameren Policy führen kann, der 
in zwei Fallstudien angewendet wurden (Ebola, frühere Detektion). 
Die Risikokommunikation im Bereich der öffentlichen Gesundheit und der 
Gesundheitssicherheit liefert wichtige thematische Ergebnisse. Die angewandte, neue 
Methodik ist ein soziales Laborformat („Social Laboratory“), das sozial, experimentell und 
systematisch ist und das Potential hat, eine eigene methodische Kategorie zu werden. Sowohl 
Inhalt als auch die methodischen Ansätze können zu einer nachhaltigen Umsetzung des neuen 
Risikokommunikations-Paradigmas in Gesundheitssystemen und öffentlicher Gesundheits-
praxis beitragen. 
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I. Introduction 
This introduction gives a brief overview of the field of risk communication research in public 
health and introduces the main contributions to the field of risk communication in public health 
and health security both at a thematic, content level of risk communication research and at a 
broader methodological level.  
The first chapter introduces the international legislative framework of risk communication 
practice and its recent developments. It then outlines the demand for evidence in risk 
communication research, strategy development, assessment and evaluation as well as teaching 
and training formats for a new risk communication practice. The second chapter introduces the 
key concepts of risk communication that respond to the need for research, policy and practice. 
It describes the contributions to the new paradigm of risk communication in public health both 
from a research perspective and as a methodological approach. Building on the paradigm shift 
in risk communication research, advances in strategy development at policy level and 
assessment and evaluation tools are described. Finally, a case study on Ebola and on earlier 
detection exemplify the new risk communication paradigm in public health security practice.  
The third chapter summarises an outlook at content, practice level of risk communication and 
as a methodological approach; it concludes with a brief description of a framework for a 
sustainable implementation of the new risk communication paradigm in public health research, 
policy and practice.  
  
1. Risk communication in public health and health security 
Risk communication as a technical term and theoretical concept has undergone significant 
changes and reflect current societal developments. The same is true for the concept of public 
health – and the more recent introduction of the public health security concept.  
 
Public health security and risk communication – international legislative framework 
Infectious agents and diseases can pose public health risks through natural occurring outbreaks, 
accidental or intentional release from laboratories or through misuse of pathogens in biological 
weapons. This ambivalence of infectious diseases as naturally occurring or intentionally 
manipulated threats is expressed in the term “dual-use”.  
Public health risks that can cause international concerns are a matter of increasing political 
awareness and higher priority on the international political and scientific agendas (e.g. G7, 
Global Health Security Agenda, G20, etc.) and was even part of the Munich Security 
!
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conference in 2017.1 
 
International Health Regulations (2005) 
In the aftermath of the outbreak of “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome” (SARS) in 2002, the 
international community and the World Health Organisation (WHO) updated and implemented 
the revised International Health Regulations in 2005 (IHR 2005) that request from all Member 
States to build the capacity to prevent, detect and respond to public health emergencies that can 
spread internationally or cause damage to the international community. The IHR (2005) 
identify eight core capacities that Member States need to develop, strengthen and maintain. 
Risk communication is one of the core capacities under IHR (2005) and is understood – 
following the definition of WHO – as “a multi-level and multi-faceted process, which aims to 
help stakeholders define risks, identify hazards, assess vulnerabilities and promote community 
resilience, thereby promoting the capacity to cope with an unfolding public health 
emergency.”2 
 
Risk communication in a traditional understanding was following the command-and-control 
style of crisis response that focussed on the timely transmission of information, advice and 
recommendations to the public to ensure smooth operations during the time of an outbreak. 
The IHR (2005) introduces a broader understanding of risk communication that conceptualise 
risk communication throughout the lifecycle of a public health emergency (before, during and 
after) as multi-sectoral and multilevel process between stakeholders and the public, and aiming 
at gathering multiple sources of intelligence for risk assessment in order to better understand 
risks, engage with communities and promote resilience. Member States are obliged to build 
and assess their IHR core capacities.  
 
IHR 2005 Joint External Evaluation tool (2016)  
In order to facilitate and strengthen IHR (2005) capacity building, the Global Health Security 
Agenda (GHSA) has suggested a joint external evaluation tool (JEE 2016)3 that compliments 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/events/2017-02-17-msc-roundtable-report.pdf 
2
  http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/84933/1/WHO_HSE_GCR_2013.2_eng.pdf  (April 2013); Page 16.   
3 https://www.ghsagenda.org/assessments 
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IHR assessments and supports countries to identify strengths and weaknesses in their capacity 
profile. The evaluation tool outlines five outcome areas of risk communication:  
⏐ Risk communication systems (plans, mechanism, etc.), 
⏐ Internal and Partner communication and coordination,  
⏐ Public communication, 
⏐ Communication engagement with affected communities, and 
⏐ Dynamic listening and rumour management. 
 
In the newer understanding the aim of risk communication is that: “States Parties should have 
risk communication capacity which is multi-level and multi-faced, real time exchange of 
information, advice and opinion between experts and officials or people […] so that they can 
take informed decisions to mitigate the effects of the threat or hazard and take protective and 
preventive action. It includes a mix of communication and engagement strategies like media 
and social media communication, mass awareness campaigns, health promotion, social 
mobilization, stakeholder engagement and community engagement.”4  
 
With this broader scope, the key areas of risk communication include changes to public health 
practice that impact on the roles and responsibilities of public health authorities. While the 
focus of risk communication used to be primarily on the timely transmission of scientific 
information to the public during a crisis, the time period is now extended to the entire public 
health emergency encompassing prevention, preparedness, detection, response and recovery 
(“before, during and after”). The character of risk communication has also changed: from a 
unidirectional conveyance of scientific information and assessments, to an engaging and 
listening approach to communities in order to better understand communities concerns and 
perceptions of risks. Public health authorities are required to use multiple sources of 
intelligence, formal (e.g. KAP surveys) and informal (e.g. rumour), to inform their risk 
assessment and risk communication. In order to deliver in these new roles of risk 
communication, organisational changes at public health authority level are required to 
accommodate these changed demands and the intended impact of risk communication. The 
desired impact of risk communication in the understanding of WHO most recent IHR 
assessment is that “responsible entities effectively communicate and actively listen and 
incorporate the publics’ and communities’ concerns through the media, social media, mass 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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!
14 
awareness campaigns, health promotion, social mobilization, stakeholder engagement and 
community engagement for increased risk awareness to reduce and mitigate the expected 
impact of the health hazard before, during and after public health events.”5  
 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030) 
This new understanding of risk communication is re-iterated through the third major 
international framework: The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030). 
The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) has published its revised 
framework to reduce and mitigate risks and promote resilience that reinforces the key attributes 
of the changes in the understanding of risk communication. The “Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030)” states that disaster risk reduction builds on the 
collaboration between multiple sectors and an “all-of-society engagement and partnership.”6 It 
requires “a coordination mechanism within and across sectors and with relevant stakeholders 
at all levels.”7  
While the IHR and JEE frameworks describe the activities and outcomes of risk 
communication, the risk reduction approach stresses the importance of a governance structure 
that supports these activities, reinforces the outcome areas and underlines the crucial role of 
coordination mechanisms between sectors and different stakeholders.  
 
These three international frameworks describe the changed character and purpose of risk 
communication: from a limited communication activity during an emergency to a governance 
approach that coordinates a multi-sectoral, all-of-society engagement and partnership with 
strategic activities in the information gathering, communication and coordination.  
In accordance with these conceptual changes in risk communication, the roles and 
responsibilities of public health authorities have also changed: they - should - now use multiple 
sources of intelligence such as formal (e.g. CAP surveys) and informal (e.g. rumour) sources 
to inform their risk assessment, engage with communities and apply traditional and new means 
of communication, and collaborate proactively with other stakeholders.  
 
In order to reflect these changes, four areas of risk communication outputs are needed:  
First, it requires research into the new paradigm of risk communication. This evidence is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/204368/1/9789241510172_eng.pdf?ua=1 page 68 
6 http://www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf page 13 
7 http://www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf page 13 
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needed to inform health policy decision making;  
Second, risk communication strategy development is necessary that goes beyond simple 
communication training, but supports and accompanies health authorities to find and fill their 
new roles and responsibilities;  
Third, evaluation tools need to provide information about the progress of risk communication, 
feedback changes and pinpoint to improvement areas. They are also needed to justify spending 
and investment.  
Fourth, teaching and training of this new risk communication in public health and health 
security is required to build the knowledge base for sustainable development and lasting 
progress.  
 
 
2. Key concepts of risk communication  
The international legislative framework of risk communication in the field of public health and 
health security (IHR 2005, JEE and Sendai Framework 2015-2020) demand scientific 
evidence, policy advice and good practice examples to inform decision-making and 
governance.  
The key contributions to advancing research, policy and practice are structured around five 
thematic areas:  
⏐ Paradigm shift in risk communication,  
⏐ Strategy development at health policy level,  
⏐ Assessment score for public health security, 
⏐ Evaluation framework for public health interventions, and  
⏐ Good practice examples (Ebola and earlier detection). 
 
Paradigm shift in risk communication  
The major contributions to risk communication research are the introduction of the new 
paradigm of risk communication describing four distinct changes in the risk communication 
activities and a structured risk communication activity matrix that allows for systematic 
assessment and strategic planning of activities.  
The publication “Risk communication as core public health competence”8 in Eurosurveillance 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Petra Dickmann, Thomas Abraham, Satyajit Sarkar, Piotr Wysocki, Sabrina Cecconi, Franklin Apfel and Ülla-
Karin Nurm (2016): Risk communication as a core public health competence in infectious disease management: 
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2016 outlines risk communication as a core competence in public health and presents the 
changes in the understanding of risk communication that leads to a different practice of risk 
communication. This publication is innovative in two regards: it introduces a coherent, 
systematic approach to the new paradigm of risk communication; and it applies this new 
paradigm to a teaching and training methodology.  
 
The new risk communication paradigm thus sees risk communication in a more complex 
approach as a governance approach with strategic activity areas of information (gathering, 
assessing and sharing), communication (strategies, key messages and means of 
communication) and coordination (at various administrative levels).  
The four key changes and characteristics of the new paradigm are:  
1. From telling to listening: Risk communication is viewed as a complex process. It is as 
concerned with listening and understanding as it is with providing information and advice.  
2. From information transfer to relationship building: Risk communication is not seen as 
exclusively based on information transmission, but as a strategic activity concerned with 
relationship building between authorities and the public over time.  
3. From “command and control” to creating supportive environments: Risk communication 
is not just about directive action, but is concerned with creating supportive environments where 
people can make their own informed decisions.  
4. From silo’ed to coordinated approaches: Multiple actors and sectors are inevitably involved 
with all risk communication related issues. Risk communication is concerned with integration 
and partnership.  
 
Applying these changes to a systematic approach of risk communication practice, this paper 
introduces a matrix of risk communication activities across the lifecycle of a public health 
event.  
 
Risk communication activities BEFORE  
Public health 
emergency  
 
PREPAREDNESS 
DURING 
Public health 
emergency  
 
RESPONSE 
AFTER 
Public health  
emergency  
 
LEGACY 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
development of the ECDC training curriculum and programme, Eurosurveillance 2016; 
21(16); pii=30188, DOI: dx.doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2016.21.14.30188 
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Information 
Listening 
Gathering    
Assessing    
Sharing    
Communication 
Relationship 
building 
Communications 
(actions: flyer, 
website, etc.) 
 Crisis 
communication 
 
Key messages / 
Content 
   
 
Strategy / 
Methods 
   
 
Coordination 
Supportive 
environments 
  
Local     
Regional    
National    
International    
Figure 1: Matrix of risk communication8 
 
The training approach that was piloted at the European Centre for Disease Control and 
Prevention (ECDC) is built on this new paradigm of risk communication both in the topics 
addressed and in the methods applied.  
The new risk communication training extended the scope of risk communication to activities 
before, during and after public health events. Moving risk communication away from responses 
during a crisis, case studies of continuous infectious diseases challenges, e.g. antimicrobial 
resistance, vaccine hesitancy, etc., were used. The narrative of risk communication has more 
to do with knowledge- and relationship building than simple information conveyance. The 
training adopted a deconstructive approach and facilitated a look at the discourses that shape 
people’s decisions and behaviour. The pilot also put an emphasis on interactive, critical and 
reflective processes in groups. Rather than listening to lectures, a structured, moderated hands-
on approach was utilised that engaged with participants and facilitates active learning, 
understanding and networking. The training aimed to help participants to understand the 
concepts that underlie risk communication advice before they are able to really implement 
“good advice” on risk communication strategies into their own realities. It is not enough to 
follow a set protocol with practical risk communication advice (e.g. be honest, communicate 
early, etc.). Once underlying risk communication concepts are understood and internalised, 
appropriate practical activities follow in an easy and intuitive way. Thus the training adopted 
!
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a reflective approach. Rather than emphasising detailed guidance that lists the steps to go from 
A to B, the training took a reflective approach that aimed to provide participants with a map, 
the skill and literacy to read the map and the ability to design their own risk communication 
strategies that work in their realities.  
This pilot training approach was evaluated and participants rated the training topics and 
methodology highly.  
 
The second publication that contributes to the advance of evidence in the field of risk 
communication in public health, is an analysis of a public health authority helpdesk answering 
questions in regards to antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and Meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus (MRSA), in particular. The analysis “Re-thinking risk communication: information 
needs of patients, health professionals and the public regarding MRSA - the communicative 
behaviour of a public health network in Germany responding to the demand for information“9 
stresses the role of public health authorities as major actors in the field of risk communication 
and reflects the relation between information and communication. This analysis found that 
while helpdesk response surely offered scientific advice, they also included “other 
communication services that went beyond the provision of scientific facts, such as follow up 
calls, referral suggestions and consultations on behalf of the caller”. The article concludes that 
“these social communication activities seem to have an important impact on the acceptability 
of public health recommendations and use of the helpdesk.” This mixed-method analysis 
supports the paradigm of risk communication in regards to the activities of public health 
professionals that are part of the risk communication process, moving its core activity from 
conveying information and communicating risk information to being a knot in the social fabric 
of a health system, concerned with relationship building and listening.  
 
Also concerned with MRSA and risk communication is the final contribution to this chapter of 
paradigm shift in risk communication. The article “Risk communication of antimicrobial 
resistance: The Role of Clinical Practice, Regulation and Other Policies in Five European 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Petra Dickmann, Katharina Wittgens, Sam Keeping, Dorothea Mischler and Ursel Heudorf (2015): Re-thinking 
risk communication: information needs of patients, health professionals and the public regarding MRSA - the 
communicative behaviour of a public health network in Germany responding to the demand for information. 
Public Health 12/2015. 
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Countries in regards to MRSA”10 has two important contributions to the discourse about risk 
communication practice in public health: first, it introduces regulations and guidelines “as 
implicit messages that contribute to the health-related risk communication and subsequently to 
the public perception of risk posed by MRSA.” The diversity and inconsistency of these 
implicit messages that contribute to the explicit risk communication messages are an 
underestimated and under reflected area of risk communication. Second, it disentangles and 
deconstructs a public health policy approach that puts responsibility for global public threats 
from health policy to individual behaviour advice. Singling out individuals, or even reducing 
the complex problem of AMR to hand washing, is probably a useful strategy to delegate 
responsibility, but it does not contribute to a constructive and sustainable way to tackle one of 
the most important questions for infectious diseases in the 21st century.  
 
The implications of the new risk communication paradigm in the traditional field of infectious 
diseases (e.g. MRSA) and public health authorities are  
⏐ A novel perspective to analyse and understand policy and practice,  
⏐ Additional scientific evidence to a body of research, 
⏐ A structured and systematic approach to risk communication activities, that enable  
⏐ Assessment and evaluation of the role of public health professionals. 
 
Strategy development at health policy level  
The broader understanding of risk communication moves beyond a common understanding 
that limits risk communication to a timely conveyance of information about health risks to a 
public. It considers risk communication not as a technical expertise in communication but 
rather as a strategic activity supporting the entire management of public health risks. This 
transformation process, thus, requires from national public health agencies to re-think their 
current risk communication strategies and plans. Addressing this new challenge, national 
public health agencies have little guidance in developing their national risk communication 
strategies and creating a modern risk communication governance. While there is existing 
guidance on the communication process and on what health authorities need to consider to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34!Petra Dickmann, Sam Keeping, Nora Döring, Andrea E Schmidt, Claudia Binder, Sergio Ariño-Blasco and 
Joan Gil(2017): Communicating the Risk of MRSA: The Role of Clinical Practice, Regulation and Other 
Policies in Five European Countries. Front. Public Health 5:44. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2017.00044!
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design communication strategies, little is done to support strategy development at governance 
level.  
The major contribution of the publication “Biological risks to public health – lessons from an 
international conference to inform the development of national risk communication strategies. 
Report of an international conference on risk communication strategies before, during and 
after public health emergencies”11 is to provide a multi-sectoral platform for international 
discussions and a systematic approach to develop risk communication strategies at national 
public health authority level.  
Using the risk communication activity matrix (s. figure 1) the discussions were structured into 
an overall governance approach with the strategic areas of information (gathering, assessing 
and sharing), communication (strategies, key messages and means of communication) and 
coordination (at various administrative levels). Risk communication is not merely a technical 
capacity, but a governance approach that enables broader practice and improvements of 
technical areas. In order to accommodate this new paradigm of risk communication, 
organisations need to identify and promote changes to enable this risk governance approach. 
The discussion concluded four key areas of improvements in risk communication: consider 
communication as a multidimensional process in risk communication, broaden the biomedical 
paradigm by integrating social science (and other source of) intelligence into epidemiological 
risk assessments, strengthen multi-sectoral collaboration including local organisations, and 
spearhead changes in own organisations for better risk communication governance.  
National strategies should design risk communication to be proactive, participatory, multi-
sectoral, facilitating the connection between sectors and strengthening collaboration. 
The results of this international discussion informed the development of national risk 
communication strategies in North Africa (Morocco and Tunisia).  
 
Assessment score for public health security 
Biological risks pose challenges to public health. These risks can be naturally occurring disease 
outbreaks at national and international levels, accidental exposure to pathogens in the context 
of biomedical diagnostics and research or intentional use of pathogens for harmful purposes. 
Biological risk management focuses on these following three areas of: 
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i) The preparedness for the impact of naturally occurring disease outbreaks on national or 
international scale on individual and public health, national and international economy, 
social and other systems;  
ii) Biosafety as understood by the UN as “principles, technologies, practices and measures 
implemented to prevent the accidental release of, or unintentional exposure to 
pathogenic agents.”12 
iii) Biosecurity which refers to the “protection, control and accountability measures 
implemented to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release of 
pathogenic agents and related resources as well as unauthorized access to, retention 
or transfer of such material.”12  
The World Health Organization has recognised the importance of biological risks to public 
health and has updated its International Health Regulations (IHR) in 2005 to ensure that all 
member states build their capacities to prevent, detect, respond to and recover from biological 
and other defined risks to public health and ensure to minimise the impact on trade and travel 
(IHR 2005). Public health authorities have worked on technical areas to mitigate biological 
risks, such as improving disease surveillance systems, laboratory capacities, risk assessment 
and risk communication. However, biosafety and biosecurity concepts are complex (as is risk 
communication), lack standardisation, and are often understood differently by scientific and 
security experts, policy-makers and the public. To address this challenge, the publication “The 
Marburg Biosafety and Biosecurity Scale (MBBS): A framework for risk assessment and risk 
communication”13  provides a clear and systematic classification of risk assessment categories, 
a discreet metric for biosafety and biosecurity and rational framework to facilitate risk 
communication. Similar to the Richter-scale to assess and communicate the severity of 
earthquakes, the MBBScale provides a rational score and visual chart to assess and 
communicate biosafety and biosecurity threats (figure 2).  
The MBBScale draws on the concept of the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) and 
evaluates the impact of laboratory-originated incidents on three categories: personnel, integrity 
of containment (in this context: biocontainment) and the environment. It describes a new seven 
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category scoring scale of biosafety and biosecurity threats that helps clarify risks, facilitate 
coordination and communication and improve public understanding of risk related to biosafety 
and biosecurity. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Y-shape of biosafety and biosecurity scale13 
 
A second major contribution to the public health security is a framework for biosafety and 
biosecurity capacity building: “Local – People – Make Sense: Biosafety and Biosecurity. A 
relative risk-based framework for safer, more secure and sustainable laboratory capacity 
building”.14 This publication is important in two regards: it provides a novel framework that 
can guide capacity building in biosafety and biosecurity (content level); it also applies a new 
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and innovative methodology to use a structured and facilitated group dynamic to generate 
evidence (methodological level).  
Laboratory capacity building is characterized by a paradox between endemicity and resources: 
Countries with high endemicity of pathogenic agents often have low and intermittent resources 
(water, electricity) and capacities (laboratories, trained staff, adequate regulations). 
Meanwhile, countries with low endemicity of pathogenic agents often have high containment 
facilities with costly infrastructure and maintenance governed by regulations. To ensure the 
safe and secure handling of pathogenic agents the current practice is mainly focussed on 
exporting the complex costly containment, ‘western standard’ of laboratory safety into 
vulnerable areas of the world with high demand for laboratory activity due to emergency 
outbreak situations or a continuous high prevalence. This practice has not always been effective 
to date, needed investments have not been fully sustainable, the ‘western standard’ of biosafety 
relies on adequate and continuous access to resources and educated personnel.  
The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) points to a lack of collaboration and integration 
of health and security approaches and communities and thus calls to end the silo-thinking and 
encourages an integrated health security approach.  
The publication introduces a generic framework that is guided by the phrase ‘LOCAL – 
PEOPLE – MAKE SENSE’ that represents three major principles: capacity building according 
to local needs (local) with an emphasis on relationship and trust-building (people) and 
continuous outcome and impact measurement (make sense). The framework applies a relative-
risk approach: The relative-risk approach focuses on conditions of biosafety and biosecurity 
that can make work safer, more secure and sustainable in specific environments. To this end, 
the approach builds on a contextual assessment of risks and considers the system and 
environments (e.g., information, communication and coordination systems) in which 
laboratory capacity is being built. This differential approach reflects and relates ‘inside’ of the 
laboratory with ‘outside’ the laboratory and considers the permeability of the barrier separating 
them. This approach focuses on the barrier that separates the inside from the outside and 
provides a structured assessment of the relative risks. Rather than defining the endpoint as 
adherence to Western standards, it focuses on agreed outcomes (e.g. maintaining the 
biocontainment barrier) and develops contextually appropriate, relevant parameters for 
biosafety and biosecurity. This generic framework could guide international policy decision-
making to build safer, more secure and sustainable laboratory capacity. 
 
The methodology to create and design the framework draws on the risk communication 
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paradigm. The two-day workshop to create the framework was based on interactive, 
interdisciplinary work in small groups of people coming from different professional 
backgrounds (biomedical, sciences, engineering and policy-making) with experience from both 
fields of biosafety and biosecurity in low-, mid- and high-resource settings. The workshop 
applied group work that was structured to trigger dialogue and debate on current practices, 
stimulate thinking about what changes could lead to safer, more secure and sustainable 
laboratory capacity-building (particularly in low-income countries), and capture participants’ 
insights on the specific components, attributes and principles of such changes. In the group 
work, participants used analytical tools and templates building on the matrix of risk 
communication governance and its strategic areas of information (gathering, assessing, 
sharing), communication (strategies, key messages and means of communication) and 
coordination (at various administrative levels) to analyse the contradictions, contrasts and 
issues and presented their results in plenary sessions for broader discussion. They further 
reflected on conditions and influencing factors and developed actions to strengthen facilitating 
factors for biosafety and biosecurity.  
 
Evaluation framework for public health interventions 
Evaluation of public health interventions is essential to monitor progress, identify and assess 
areas for improvements and demonstrate useful outcomes and overall impact. Researchers have 
used before and after measures, various models and data sources to estimate how much 
difference in awareness, choice and behavioural patterns, a given risk communication 
intervention has made for a particular outbreak. These measurements have been built on 
approaches to risk communication that mainly focussed on the need to find the right way to tell 
people what to do in times of a crisis. Such approaches are important, but do not reflect current 
thinking and concerns about the limitations of just focussing on uni-directional, hierarchical 
information conveyance from health officials to the public. Risk communication as described 
in a new paradigm is now understood as a more interactive, holistic, continuous and engaging 
activity that focuses on dialogue, intelligence gathering, building relationships over time, a 
knowledge base informed by new and accessible communication technologies (e.g., social 
media and networks), and supportive environments. However, while the importance of risk 
communication in public health interventions is increasingly acknowledged and embraced e.g. 
as a core capacity in the WHO IHR 2005, no standardised measurement tools have been agreed 
to evaluate the impact of risk communication activities upon unfolding infectious disease 
emergencies and continuous threats. 
!
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The publication “Making sense of communication interventions in public health emergencies 
– an evaluation framework for risk communication”15 is the result of an international, inter-
agency collaboration (WHO, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 
Unicef) with risk communication experts, born from the demand and urgent need to better 
understand how risk communication interventions make or can make a difference.  
This publication introduces a new and innovative evaluation framework for risk 
communication. It uses the dynamic of an event (such as an outbreak) and the dynamic of 
response interventions, e.g. a public health authority. Relating these two dynamics, the 
framework identifies four key performance areas where risk communication activities can 
improve the situation:  
! EARLIER detection (1): reducing the time lag between onset of outbreak and its 
detection by getting closer to and more engaged with the community and the infectious 
activities on the ground 
! FASTER response (2): reducing the time lag between detection and response activities  
! SMOOTHER coordination (3): better coordination of national and international response 
activities  
! SMARTER legacy and governance (4): feeding back to improve decision-making and 
response in the current event and leaving a legacy to improve preparedness, control, 
response and recovery for future outbreaks 
  
Figure 3: Earlier – Faster – Smoother – Smarter Approach15 
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Applying the risk communication activity matrix that conceptualises risk communication as a 
governance approach with its three strategic axes of information (gathering, assessing, 
sharing), communication (strategies, key messages and means of communication) and 
coordination (at various administrative levels), the evaluation process can map and monitor 
activities according this systematic approach; it can also identify areas for improvements.  
 
This evaluation framework is an original and innovative contribution to the current thinking of 
risk communication, its measurement and evaluation.  
 
In order to test the evaluation framework, two case studies have been published so far: one 
reporting the results of the risk communication methodology to improve preparedness, 
detection of, response to and recovery from Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa; two, a 
systematic investigation into conditions and influencing factors for earlier detection in low- 
and mid-income countries.  
 
Case studies  
International activities to respond to the Ebola crisis in West Africa (2015-16) were mainly 
focussed around the biomedical paradigm of western health systems. This approach clashed 
with community-based health narratives, the social fabric of communities and the role of 
community health workers.  
The publication “Using lessons learned from previous Ebola outbreaks to inform current risk 
management”16 systematically gathered and collated local experience, knowledge and 
intelligence to improve the risk communication and management approach. The outputs of this 
meeting were three major lessons that focus on improving communication, working with 
communities, and building and strengthening local capacity. However, apart from the thematic 
contributions to solve a current global problem, the methodology to gather, assess, analyse and 
reflect on past experience, together with a systematic approach to create and generate 
recommendations was a particular milestone in the conceptual landscape of risk 
communication. The workshop was designed for ‘shapers’: a mixed audience of health 
professionals, community leaders, journalists, policy-makers, religious leaders, traditional 
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healers and media representatives from eastern and central Africa who shape the narrative of 
infectious disease management, risk communication and community outreach in their 
countries. Participants from these various backgrounds worked in facilitated small interactive 
groups using analytical tools to elicit the underlying assumptions, perceptions and beliefs of 
infection control management in their countries with the aim to shift the agenda and the 
narrative to people-centred medicine and a community-based health paradigm.  
As in previous workshops, the particular incubator approach was applied – at a methodological 
level - that provides a logical flow through a serious of group work sessions that are themselves 
structured with matrixes and templates. This systematic approach allowed to reflect “outside 
the box” of conventional knowledge gathering, because it enables participants to challenge 
their own conceptions and beliefs and disrupts their own logic (“deconstruction”); building on 
this deconstruction, participants can then re-assemble innovative, new solutions that are locally 
informed and relevant for their particular contexts.  
 
The workshop methodology was further applied in an “Ebola – Intensified Preparedness 
Programme (IPP)” that was conducted in Ebola-affected and not-yet affected countries, and 
other settings. This methodology will soon be published.  
 
A second example of the application of the novel risk communication methodology is an 
investigation into conditions and influencing factors of earlier detection. The publication 
“Drivers for earlier detection. A systematic literature review”17 provides a structured overview 
of systems and guidance to detect health events earlier. Infectious disease outbreaks can spread 
rapidly, causing enormous losses to individual health, national economies, and social 
wellbeing. Through early detection of an infectious disease outbreak, a small outbreak can 
potentially be contained at the local level, thereby reducing adverse impacts. The ambition is 
to better understand what conditions and factors of a health system can lead to detect 
outbreaks/events earlier. This systematic literature review applies the traditional PRISMA 
methodology and it reveals that despite significant investments to detect outbreaks early, there 
is very little evidence with respect to factors that influence earlier detection.  
This publication is the initial step into a field of research into conditions and their influencing 
factors that can modify detection time, and potentially quality. The innovative and original 
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aspect of this review is the introduction of a generic disease/event detection model that can be 
applied in a variety of settings. This generic model provides a systematic structure to sort 
evidence. Infectious disease surveillance follows a multi-level public health model, where a 
case or an event first must be recognised as unusual, and then reported and assessed (as a 
signal). If the case or event meets criteria for further notification, it is reported to higher level 
authorities and subsequent assessment/investigation ensues. This detection process can be 
categorised into the following five generic steps: 1) Recognition (of a case or an event); 2) Low 
level reporting; 3) Low level assessment; 4) Higher level reporting; and 5) Higher level 
assessment (when outbreak declaration occurs). While the key players involved at each step 
will vary by region/country and disease, the basic structure is the same.  
This generic disease/event detection model and the new risk communication methodology are 
further applied in data generation in low- and mid-income countries. The results of this research 
will be published soon.  
 
3. Perspective 
Current and future activities in the field of risk communication in public health and health 
security can be summarised into three main categories:  
First, at a thematic level, they are relevant outputs how to improve and enrich risk 
communication research, policy and practice in the four key performance areas, such as  
⏐ Earlier detection, e.g. in infectious diseases prevention and control, non-communicable 
disease detection, biosecurity health risks, etc.;  
⏐ Faster response, e.g. identifying factors at health system level that are particularly relevant 
for a speedy response;  
⏐ Smoother coordination, e.g. by supporting and providing evidence for risk communication 
as core capacity in international legislative frameworks;  
⏐ Smarter legacy, e.g. by enabling systematic reflection and learning from past events to 
inform current and future policy and governance approaches. 
 
Second, at a methodological level: the conventional approach uses quantitative, qualitative and 
mixed-method approaches to generate data and insight. While those are primarily at individual 
(or sums of individuals) or population level, the intelligence of groups is not well integrated 
into this evidence making process. The incubator workshop approach that was applied in a 
variety of settings so far, has resulted in original and innovative solutions; this approach uses 
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the dynamics of different groups (over a set time period) working together in a systematically 
structured and facilitated environment. The incubator workshop is one format of the social 
laboratories to systematically develop new and better solutions using the dynamic and 
intelligence of groups. Social laboratories offer a platform for extended investigations that are 
⏐ Social by bringing different people from various backgrounds together;  
⏐ Experimental by focusing on a question and applying a structured methodology for 
analysing ideas and creating interventions over a set time period and other controlled 
conditions; and 
⏐ Systematic by applying a structured, analytic approach using objective templates and 
matrices.  
This approach has the potential to become a genuine methodological category.  
 
Third, the recent developments in policy, legislation and practice require people and 
professionals who are able and competent to deliver in these new roles and responsibilities of 
public health and health security in a complex world. Modern teaching and sustainable training 
are ideally set in a structured and supportive environment, such as a degree course in public 
health from a multi-sectoral, One Health perspective, for long-lasting implementation of 
competence and capacities, skills and expertise.  
 
!
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II. Paradigm shift in risk communication  
1. RISK COMMUNICATION AS A CORE PUBLIC HEALTH COMPETENCE IN 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE MANAGEMENT: Developing the ECDC training curriculum 
and programme18  
 
Abstract 
Risk communication has been identified as a core competence for guiding public health 
responses to infectious disease threats. The IHR (2005) calls for all countries to build capacity 
and a comprehensive understanding of health risks before a public health emergency to allow 
systematic and coherent communication, response and management. Research studies indicate 
that while outbreak and crisis communication concepts and tools have long been on the agenda 
of public health officials, there still exists an expressed need to clarify and integrate risk 
communication concepts into more standardised practices and improve risk communication 
and health, particularly among disadvantaged populations. 
To address these challenges, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) 
convened a group of risk communication experts to review and integrate existing approaches 
and emerging concepts in the development of a training curriculum. This process articulated a 
new approach which breaks with the conventional understanding and practice of 
communication as a conveyance of information and understands risk communication as having 
more to do with knowledge- and relationship-building. 
In a pilot training this conceptual approach was reflected both in the topics addressed and in 
the methods applied. Rather than working exclusively on outbreak scenarios and early 
communication to prepare for health crises, the course put an emphasis on addressing 
continuous infectious risk communication challenges e.g. antimicrobial resistance and 
vaccination.   
This article introduces the new conceptual approach to risk communication capacity building 
that emerged from this process, presents the pilot training approach developed, and shares the 
results of the course evaluation.  
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Introduction 
The International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) have been developed to help all countries 
better prepare and respond to public health emergencies of international concerns. The 
importance of risk communication is recognised as one of the eight core capacities in the 
successful management of infectious diseases and other public health risks both in terms of 
gathering intelligence, and in enabling the functional flow of information, communication and 
coordination [1]. During a public health emergency time is short and important information, 
communication and coordination tasks such as identifying public communication focal points 
and stakeholders, developing and implementing reliable communication structures, etc. should 
be in place to allow systematic and coherent crisis communication and management [2]. 
Risk communication is understood in this context as serving a double role: risk communication 
should prepare for crisis management; and it should build capacity and a comprehensive 
understanding of health risks among health officials and the general public. This capacity 
building is needed for peaks in demand and public health emergencies, but also for managing 
continuous health threats, such as outbreaks of measles (due to low coverage or uptake of 
vaccines) or the emergence of antimicrobial resistance (due to overuse or misuse of antibiotics). 
Poor risk communication can even cause harm [2]. 
Research studies indicate that while outbreak and crisis communication concepts and tools 
have long been on the agenda of public health officials, there is a need to better address risk 
communication concepts and practices and integrate conceptual approaches into sound practice 
and improve risk communication and health, in particular for disadvantaged populations and 
to those areas with low confidence in vaccines [3,4]. 
 
Currently, there is little consensus about the meaning, impact and methods of risk 
communication in infectious disease contexts. Risk communication as a technical term 
emerged during the early 1970 in the environmental health debates and has since then spread 
into different disciplines and discourses [5,6]. The understanding of risk communication as 
“information exchange about health risks caused by environment, industrial, or agricultural, 
processes, policies, or products among individuals, groups and institutions” [6] has become 
more prominent post September 11, 2001. The conceptual foundations of risk communication 
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draw on complex social, cognitive and psychological research elaborated in a wide variety of 
areas; including: behavioural communications, environmental health, health promotion, 
governance and social marketing [6]. The public health practice of risk communication, 
however, has been slow to embrace such a broader perspective and has been mainly focussed 
on approaches that rationalise and work to improve risk communication as the communication 
of risks from public health authorities to their publics [7,8].  
 
Efforts to broaden this approach to risk communication to implementation in the field in public 
health practice face three substantial challenges:  
Firstly, it is not known how it is to be done (“you don’t know because no one knows”). While 
there is a plethora of practical guidelines, best-practice examples and ad-hoc advice (e.g. WHO 
outbreaks communications [9], CERC [10], etc.), this advice is mainly orientated towards 
communicating risks in outbreak and crisis situations [11]. While there is a multiplicity of 
conceptual approaches to risk perception and communication, e.g. Slovic [12,13], 
Fischhoff/Morgan [14,15], Kasperson [16], there is little integration of these approaches into 
risk communication in public health practice.  
Secondly, there is a lack of individual skills (“you don’t know how to do it”): there is lack of 
formal training and practical experience is scarce as the approach has not found entrance into 
mainstream public health academia and learning [17].  
Thirdly, there is a lack of supportive environments: even though risk communication has been 
designated as a core IHR capacity, it has yet to be routinely implemented into public health 
organization planning, their risk assessment, and management procedures [18].  
Acknowledging these challenges, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC) has initiated the development of a training curriculum and programme to address the 
need for both conceptual and practical capacity building in risk communication as an integral 
component of disease prevention and control. To this end, ECDC invited practitioners and 
researchers on the forefront of risk communication practise to develop a new conceptual 
approach to capacity building and develop a teaching curriculum. The initial focus of the 
training was on vaccine preventable diseases, in particular enhancing measles vaccination 
uptake, and was first tested with ECDC experts in January 2013.  
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Methods 
Concept review, integration and development 
Working definitions 
Risk and crisis communication differ in many aspects and there is terminological and 
epistemological ambiguity in international fora and discussions regarding definitions and 
approaches [19]. As a working definition we use time, method and content to distinguish 
between risk communication and crisis communication. Risk communication differs from 
crisis communication as risk communication starts before crisis and continuous throughout and 
after a crisis, is less directive, has more time to explain even difficult and contradicting 
scientific positions. It also has the time and opportunity to offer diverse approaches to bridge 
the gap between the scientific assessment of health risks and public perceptions of health risks. 
The main activity areas of risk communication are information (gathering, sharing and 
assessing), communication (strategy, key messages and communications) and coordination (on 
different geographical and organisations levels (see figure 1).  
Crisis communication is the communication during an outbreak when people need to know 
exactly what to do if they are affected and how to protect themselves and others. Effective 
information is vital to prevent surges of low risk patients blocking medical infrastructures and 
to prevent the further transmission of the disease by enabling people to adopt the right 
behaviours. During an outbreak, time is short and crisis communication therefore needs to be 
concise and often unidirectional. Figure 1 displays the main activity areas of risk 
communication and helps clarify the distinction between working definitions of risk 
communication and crisis communications (see figure 1). Risk communication includes all the 
activities listed before, during and after a public health emergency. Crisis communication is 
confined to the communication during an emergency. 
 
Risk communication activities BEFORE  
Public health 
emergency  
 
PREPAREDNESS 
DURING 
Public health 
emergency  
 
RESPONSE 
AFTER 
Public health  
emergency  
 
LEGACY 
Information Gathering    
Assessing    
Sharing    
Communication Communications 
(actions: flyer, 
website, etc.) 
 Crisis 
communication 
 
Key messages / 
Content 
   
 
Strategy /    
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Methods  
Coordination 
  
Local     
Regional    
National    
International    
Figure 1: Matrix of risk communication 
 
Conceptual Approach: Communication Models  
In its conventional understanding, risk communication is often focused on finding the right 
way to tell people what to do in times of a crisis. While this objective is important, it is not 
sufficient. Risk communication is goes beyond communications of risks. It is also about 
building public health capacity to enable, encourage and empower different publics to 
understand and act upon health risks [20-21] Yet, public health officials often see their tasks 
as just providing information. They tend to rely mainly on an early, and by now outdated 
information technology paradigm that assumes a rather static and unilateral sender who 
conveys messages to addressable recipients [22]. The reality of communication and 
information though has already been transformed. The public is no longer and maybe never 
has been a passive entity to be given recommendations and guidelines to follow by institutions 
which are to be trusted. This technocratic communication model (sender-message-recipient) is 
successful in explaining how computers communicate (with each other) – but is insufficient 
when it comes to understanding how humans process information, communicate and make 
behavioural decisions. The popularity and increasingly important intelligence gathering and 
information dissemination functions of interactive social media, e.g. Facebook, Twitter, 
LinkedIn, is a strong indicator of the growing influence of de-centralised and user-generated 
connectivity in today’s rapidly changing communication marketplaces [23].  
 
A new approach for risk communication in public health 
In contrast to this conventional risk communication approach in public health, a new risk 
communication concept for public health is proposed. This builds on inputs from a variety of 
disciplines and applies a reflective approach. This new conceptual approach calls for four key 
strategic shifts in our thinking and approach to risk communication:  
1. From telling to listening: Risk communication is viewed as a complex process. It is as 
concerned with listening and understanding as it is with providing information and advice. 
Having listened and understood peoples’ different perceptions and behaviours allows for 
quicker and more effective communication when time is short. Much can be learned in this 
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area from behavioural communications approaches; which, for example, emphasise listening 
and gathering insights about what really motivates and moves the people to whom you are 
trying to communicate [24]. 
2. From information transfer to relationship building: Risk communication is not seen as 
exclusively based on information transmission, but as a strategic activity concerned with 
relationship building between authorities and the public over time [25]. Engaging affected 
populations early in development, planning, on going monitoring and evaluation enhances 
peoples’ sense of empowerment and ownership. Much can be learned in this area from social 
marketing approaches; which, for example, emphasise the importance of “exchange theory”- 
really trying to understand the benefits and rewards for a given behaviour [26,27]. 
3. From “command and control” to creating supportive environments: Risk communication 
is not just about directive action, but is concerned with creating supportive environments where 
people can make their own informed decisions. Much can be learned in this area from health 
promotion approaches; which, for example emphasises to importance of “environmental” 
factors on behaviour and the need “to make the healthy choice the easy choice.” [28] 
4. From silo’ed to coordinated approaches: Multiple actors and sectors are inevitably involved 
with all risk communication related issues. Busy “loud” information marketplaces can be hard 
to navigate with often conflicting messages. No one agency can do it alone. Risk 
communication is concerned with integration and partnership. Much can be learned in this area 
from new governance approaches; which, for example, emphasise whole-of-government and 
whole-of-society approaches [29,30]. 
 
Results 
Pilot training 
Conceptual approach to training curriculum: methods and contents  
This conceptual re-framing was reflected both in the topics addressed and in the methods 
applied.  
The new risk communication training: 
! Views risk and crisis communication as related but distinct realities. Although risk 
communication is seen as the foundation on which successful crisis communication can 
refer and rely on, risk communication is seen as having a different broader social format, 
rationale and rules.  
! Does not focus exclusively on outbreak scenarios and early communication to prepare for 
these outbreaks and other health crises. The course put an emphasis on addressing 
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continuous infectious disease risk communication challenges e.g. antimicrobial resistance 
and vaccination uptake; 
! Understands risk communication as having more to do with knowledge- and relationship 
building than simple information conveyance. The training adopted a de-constructive 
approach and facilitated a look at the discourses that shape people’s decisions and 
behaviour;  
! Sees effective risk communication strategies as context dependent. The training aimed to 
help participants to understand the concepts that underlie risk communication advice 
before they are able to really implement “good advice” on risk communication strategies 
into their own realities. It is not enough to follow a set protocol with practical risk 
communication advice (e.g. be honest, communicate early, etc.). Once underlying risk 
communication concepts are understood and internalised, appropriate practical activities 
follow in an easy and intuitive way; 
! Adopts a reflective approach. Rather than emphasising detailed guidance that lists the steps 
to go from A to B, the training took a reflective approach that aimed to provide participants 
with a map, the skill and literacy to read the map and the ability to design their own risk 
communication strategies that work in their realities; and,   
! Emphasises an interactive, critical and reflective process in groups. Rather than listening 
to lectures, a hands-on approach was utilised that engaged with participants and facilitates 
active learning, understanding and networking.   
 
Objectives and methodological approach 
The pilot training at ECDC in Stockholm took place on 17-18 January 2013 and was addressed 
to public health and communication experts working at ECDC and the EU Commission. The 
overall objective of the course was to develop the competencies of public health programme 
managers and practitioners to analyse, understand and apply risk communication concepts, 
principles and approaches to the prevention and control of communicable disease threats on 
regional, national and/or local levels.  
Course organisation  
Each day of the two-day course was organised into reflection and action sessions. The days 
started with reflection sessions introducing terms, definitions, approaches and gave time to 
discuss these. The afternoons were dedicated to actions: exploring ways to put concepts into 
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practice, testing ideas, working on scenarios related to both on-going and crisis challenges, 
discussing and getting feedback from others within small working groups and in the plenum.  
In order to maximize the utility of the discussions and ensure “real-life” learning, each 
participant was asked to complete a pre-course assignment that included the development of a 
case study based on their own contextually specific experience. These case studies informed 
group work and plenum discussions.  
 
Evaluation  
The training was evaluated with a pre- and post-course questionnaire as well as day 
assessments at the end of first and the second day. The questionnaire used close-ended 
questions with a Likert scale and open questions where a content analysis was applied.  
 
Pre-course questionnaire 
In the pre-course questionnaire, participants were asked for the knowledge and experience to 
establish a base line to assess the progress and improvement at the end of the pilot training. 
The majority considered themselves as having good knowledge and experience (table 1).  
 
 
Table 1: Knowledge and experience of participants 
 
The reason to participate in the training was mainly to receive a more formal training in risk 
communication as this was considered important for their field of work. 
Expectations were practical and conceptual: participants wished for a structured approach, 
practical examples and tools; they also hoped for a better understanding of the different 
concepts and approaches.  
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Asked for a working understanding of risk communication, participants saw communication 
and risk communication as instruments to ensure trust and transparency; they stressed the 
importance of risk communication in the prevention of infectious diseases and as foundation 
for crisis communication. The nature of risk communication was seen in the communication 
of risks and to provide information adapted to various people; risk communication in this 
meaning was seen as ability to respond to public information needs. Ultimately risk 
communication should empower people as better-informed people are more likely to modify 
their behaviour.  
 
Summary 
The majority of participants considered themselves as having good knowledge and experience 
in risk communication; which is unsurprising as the audience of the course was a mix of public 
health and communication experts. They wished for a more formal training in an important 
field of their work. Accordingly, their expectations were pragmatic such as a structured 
approach, practical examples and tools as well as aiming to better understand the concepts and 
approach.  
 
Post-course assessment 
After the course, participants were asked whether their expectations have been met and whether 
their conceptual understanding improved. Participants reported that their expectations had been 
fully met and that their understanding of concepts and approaches had increased significantly 
(table 2).  
 
Table 2: Expectations met and understanding improved 
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Participants, who said earlier that they had good knowledge and understanding of risk 
communication, expressed the need for a paradigmatic change in the understanding and 
institutional practice of risk communication and felt better prepared to advocate for this change. 
The majority felt that the training was very useful and they provided constructive feedback to 
individual sections in the day assessments. Overall, they appreciated that the training was based 
on a reflective and reframing approach rather than on providing tips, checklists and concrete 
guidance.  
 
Limitations 
This article briefly introduces a new approach towards risk communication in public health 
and presents and reports on a pilot training in risk communication for public health experts 
designed according to this new approach.  
The positive learning experience reported by the participants is encouraging; however, the 
composition of this group was exceptional as it consisted of European communication experts 
and public health experts and practitioners from all levels; this could have led to a positive bias 
in the evaluation, although others might contain that this was an overly critical group and such 
broad acceptance exceptional!  
The training was a pilot with a small sample in a privileged setting. Its approach and training 
design needs to be tested in other settings with different target groups (e.g., community base 
practitioners and managers and organisational decision makers); and ultimately the changes it 
generates in public health policy and practice will need to be evaluated.  
 
Conclusion 
The training pilot was successful in conceptualising, articulating and introducing a new 
approach towards training the trainers in risk communication in public health. Further 
systematic analysis and evaluations of risk communication approaches and trainings are 
necessary to develop the capacity on the ground that is needed for the prevention of and 
response to public health incidents and emergencies. Future training in national and local 
settings will improve the curriculum and practice of risk communication and provide insights 
into the situation and landscape of risk communication on the ground and enhance our 
understanding of the practice of risk communication.  
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ECDC as developer and advocate of this training and approach is in the position to become an 
innovative and unique centre of expertise that could set the standard for the future of risk 
communication policy and practice in public health.  
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2. RE-THINKING RISK COMMUNICATION: information needs of patients, health 
professionals and the public regarding MRSA - The communicative behaviour of a public 
health network in Germany responding to the demand for information19 
 
Abstract 
Objectives: Multidrug resistant organisms (MDRO), including Meticillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), and healthcare associated infections (HCAIs) are pressing 
issues for healthcare systems across the world.   
Information and communication are considered key tools for the prevention and management 
of infectious diseases. Public Health Authorities (PHA) are in a unique position to 
communicate with health care professionals, patients and the public regarding the health risks. 
Study design: We used PHA helpdesk interaction data to first ascertain the information 
requirements of those getting in contact with the service, and secondly to examine the 
communicative behaviour of the PHA, with a view to improving the quality of communication 
strategies.  
Method: Data on helpdesk interactions between 2010 and 2012 was obtained from a MDRO 
network of nine German PHAs. 501 recordings were coded and descriptive statistics generated 
for further qualitative thematic analysis.  
Results: Our analysis revealed a similar pattern of questions among different groups. Key areas 
of need for information were around eradication, cleaning and isolation measures. Reported 
problems were a lack of expert knowledge and continuity of treatment. The helpdesk response 
was mainly a conversation offering scientific advice, but also included other communication 
services that went beyond the provision of scientific facts, such as follow up calls, referral 
suggestions and consultations on behalf of the caller. These social communication activities 
seem to have an important impact on the acceptability of public health recommendations and 
use of the helpdesk. 
Conclusions: Our findings support a broader discussion about the role of information in the 
communication process and underline the importance of social elements in the communication 
process, such as relationship and trust building. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Petra Dickmann, Katharina Wittgens, Sam Keeping, Dorothea Mischler and Ursel Heudorf (2015): Re-
thinking risk communication: information needs of patients, health professionals and the public regarding 
MRSA - the communicative behaviour of a public health network in Germany responding to the demand for 
information. Public Health 12/2015. 
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Introduction  
Antimicrobial resistance and healthcare associated infections (HCAIs) are major topics on 
health policy agendas in countries across the world.1-4 The Chief Medical Officer in the UK, 
Professor Dame Sally Davies, recently described the threat posed by antimicrobial resistance 
as “catastrophic” and put it on the same level of seriousness as international terrorism.5 The 
rise in meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections represents a nexus 
between two important problems: healthcare associated infections and antibiotic resistant 
bacterium. With patients increasingly travelling to other countries for treatment and the growth 
of cross border health care, the prevalence of MRSA and other multidrug resistant organisms 
(MDRO) has developed a pan-European dimension which must be combated in order to ensure 
consistent quality of care and safeguard patients.6-8  
Previous research has investigated the information needs of patients and health care 
professionals with regards to different diseases and when choosing between health care 
providers.9-12 Public health authorities (PHA) are deemed to be in a unique position to 
communicate with healthcare professionals, patients, the public and other stakeholders about 
health risks and in turn can offer advice regarding to infection control. They are also in the 
position to advise both patients and health professionals regarding treatment and provide 
evidence-based recommendations to aid the smoothness of patients’ journeys through the 
different parts of the healthcare system (home, primary care, secondary care, long term care).  
The potential for movement within as well as across these different sectors, within and across 
different countries, has been highlighted as a major risk factor for increasing the spread of 
infections such as MRSA. 13-15 This led some to call for the urgent creation of professional 
networks to support the coordination and structure of care for patients with MRSA within 
countries, in cross-border regions and internationally. In response, the German federal ministry 
of health decided in 2006 to develop regional MDRO networks across the country.16-17 In the 
Rhine-Main region, a MDRO network of nine PHAs was founded in 2010, covering around 
250 participating organisations (e.g. medical institutions, long term care facilities, various 
organisations for patient transport). One of the services provided by the network is a helpdesk 
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offering advice to healthcare professionals, patients and the wider public. One qualified study 
nurse is in charge of the helpdesk answering calls during opening hours. During out-of-hours 
an answering machine records the entries and calls are returned the next day. Only in times of 
absence (e.g. vacation), a second study nurse replaces the person in charge. Both nurses have 
access to a network of physicians, microbiologists and experts in antibiotic therapy. 
At the time of the study, only around two or three other networks offered personal information 
services to patients or relatives. The helpdesk has a unique position as information service for 
both professionals and lay-people alike and is embedded in network activities with frequent 
meetings and contacts with network members.  
The helpdesk provides a high competent person at first contact to answer the questions or 
provide another service. This helpdesk was created as members of the public health authority 
perceived a lack of information and evidence-based recommendations for specific situations. 
The helpdesk is paid for by a grant from the ministry of health for a period of five years (2010-
2015). 
 
Information and communication are considered vital activities in the prevention and 
management of infectious diseases.11 Previous research stress the importance of engaging with 
patients and providing information.18-19 However, commentators on health communication, 
and risk communication in particular, are beginning to focus less on the role of scientific fact 
provision and instead emphasise the importance of social elements of communication such as 
relationship and trust building.20-22 The evidence base for the recommendation of risk 
communication strategies is still limited.22  Empirical studies analysing the communicative 
behaviour of public health authorities are much needed  if measures to prevent and manage 
infectious diseases are to be improved.   
 
Research focus and questions 
This article looks at who are the main users of PHA/MDRO network information helpdesks, 
what information they most commonly request regarding MRSA, the means by which they 
were made aware of the service and the communicative behaviour of PHA responding to their 
requests. We also investigated the media's influence on service use. By investigating 
information needs and communicative behaviour, we hoped to identify ways by which 
communication of health care related information might be improved in the future.     
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Methods 
The helpdesk provided a database of 577 recordings of calls featuring questions about MRSA 
from between May 2010 and May 2012. The raw data included information on the type of 
caller (patient, healthcare professional etc.), their location, the affected party, to whom the 
request related, the means by which they came aware of the helpdesk and the content of their 
request. The recordings were assessed for eligibility by applying predetermined criteria. After 
this initial screen, 501 recordings were deemed to be eligible for further analysis.  
A preliminary coding manual was developed and piloted on a sample of 200 calls. The manual 
was then amended and finalised based on the information garnered from the pilot after which 
it was applied to the entire sample in order to provide answers to the main research questions.  
Once the data had been coded, descriptive statistics were generated for the different classes of 
questions and also their trigger, grouped by caller type. Relative frequencies for the different 
responses offered by the helpdesk were also constructed. The trend in media spurred calls was 
also plotted against major events in order to visually assess any potential correlation. 
Descriptive statistic data were then used for qualitative thematic analysis. 
 
Results 
1) Distribution of calls 
While the distribution of different callers remains roughly the same, the monthly calls increase 
from 18 in 2010 to 22 in 2011 and 33 in 2012. 
 
Year Months Number 
of calls 
Number 
of 
questions 
Monthly 
call 
average 
% of 
questions 
by doctors 
% of 
questions 
by nurses 
% of 
questions 
by private 
people 
2010 May-Dec 
(8 
months)  
143 137 17.9 31.4 11 57.7 
2011 Jan-Dec 
(12 
months) 
264 243 22 20.2 21 58.9 
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2012 Jan-May 
(5 
months) 
167 121 33.4 31.4 20.7 47.9 
Table 1: Distribution of calls 
 
2) Caller groups 
Three different caller types were identified: doctors, nurses (in care homes), and private 
individuals (patients and their relatives). In 2010, 58% of questions to the helpdesk came from 
private individuals, 31% were asked by doctors and 11% by nurses. In 2011, the share of calls 
coming from doctors fell to around 20% at the same time as calls from nurses rose to 21%. The 
percentage of questions asked by private individuals remained roughly the same at 59%. In 
contrast, the proportion of total calls from private individuals fell in 2012 (48%), with doctors' 
share increasing (31%) and nurses staying at close to the same level as the year before.   
 
3) Key areas of interest  
Ten main questions, each with between two to six sub-categories, were identified from the 
database. Most of the questions asked by doctors and nurses were about eradication. The 
second most common question by doctors and nurses was regarding hygiene measures. Nurses 
were also shown to be commonly asking questions about the isolation of MRSA patients. 
Private individuals were mostly concerned about the control and eradication of MRSA; they 
also reported a lack of sufficient information as well as a refusal to be treated. 
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Table 2a: Questions from doctors 
 
 
Table 2b: Questions from nurses 
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Table 2c: Questions from private people 
 
4) Contact reasons 
The most frequently occurring reasons for contacting the helpdesk were concerns regarding 
current treatment, problems in the referral process of a patient, costs involved and a mix of case 
specific questions about treatments for MRSA. Another frequent reason was to ask for expert 
advice for a particular situation. A smaller proportion of callers contacted the helpdesk 
exclusively for confirmation of medical advice and/or reassurance with regards to social 
circumstances or emotional aspects of infection with MRSA. These covered subjects such as 
stigma, bullying, hysteria, general anxiety regarding contracting the bacterium and scepticism 
regarding professional advice. 
 
5) Helpdesk activities 
The majority of helpdesk activities were isolated one-to-one verbal conversations held over the 
phone (activity completed 2010: 60%/2011: 57%/2012: 67%). However, the helpdesk also 
double-checked and confirmed information with colleagues (8%/9%/2%); followed-up or 
offered a follow-up call (10%/9%/3%); contacted a health care professional on behalf of the 
patient or caller to discuss the particular service (6%/4%/6%); provided more/additional 
information (such as flyer, internet addresses, etc.) (11%/13%/15%); and referred callers to 
named/known colleagues or institutions (5%/8%/7%). 
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Table 3: Helpdesk activities 
 
6) Feedback 
The feedback from the callers was difficult to obtain as it was not explicitly asked for and noted 
in the raw database categories. However, where feedback was noted, callers expressed their 
gratefulness and acknowledged the value of the helpdesk service, which is to some degree 
reflected by the increasing number of repeat callers year by year.   
 
7) Role of the media 
Callers mentioned different triggers for contacting the PHA helpdesk such as the use of the 
internet, interactions in hospital and GP visits. 
An increase in calls, especially among private people, could be seen after one major local 
newspaper “Frankfurter Rundschau” had published an article on MRSA called “Killerkeime” 
(“killer bugs”). Other peaks were recognised in October 2011 and March 2012 following the 
advertisement of the helpdesk services in local newspapers and health care facilities.  
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Table 4a: Triggers of doctors 
 
 
Table 4b: Triggers of nurses 
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Table 4c: Triggers of the public 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Thematic distribution of questions 
The results of our analysis show that health care professionals (both doctors and nurses) as well 
as patients and relatives contact the MDRO network helpdesk, with a high level of consistency 
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in terms of the questions. While the distribution of different callers remains roughly the same, 
the monthly calls increase. We understand this increase of calls as a sign for acceptance, 
increasing popularity and proof of usefulness of the helpdesk. 
 
Nursing staff 
Nursing home staff were mainly concerned with issues relating to cleaning and hygiene, 
isolation practices and eradication measures, as these represent their main responsibilities. The 
consistent nature of the types of questions among this population suggests that informational 
needs are not being addressed elsewhere, as this information should be seminal to their daily 
activities. 
Nursing staff also contacted the helpdesk because of perceived problems in the continuity of 
care for MRSA patients (“refusal to treat MRSA patients”). This seems to indicate 
organisational issues as opposed to knowledge deficiencies of callers, and also demonstrates a 
belief of nurses that the helpdesk might be able to influence those in charge of organising care 
as well as provide recommendations.  
 
Doctors 
Doctors were found to mainly ask questions about eradication and cleaning. Other information 
needs identified related to diagnostics and specific aspects of eradication. Again, these themes 
are stable over the observed time period and reflect the responsibility and tasks of doctors. A 
peak in 2012 indicates problems in the continuity of treatment of MRSA patients that 
corresponds with the results from the nursing staff.  
 
Public 
Private individuals contacted the helpdesk mainly regarding questions about eradication and 
infection control. Their information needs were also focussed on cleaning (with a peak seen in 
2011) and questions about protection against infection (peaking a year earlier). Interestingly, 
the public contacted the helpdesk due to lack of sufficient information provided by healthcare 
professionals. The calls from members of the public also indicated a persistent problem in the 
form of continuity of care due to refusals to continue treatment.  
 
The thematic distribution of questions reveals two major aspects: all groups report a persistent 
problem with the continuity of care and they indicate a lack of sufficient information. It is, 
however, interesting to note that while information is widely available and can be obtained 
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from several sources, such as GPs, online, books, magazines, people decide to call the 
helpdesk.  
 
The role of the Public Health Authority  
The helpdesk was set up expressly to provide scientific advice and support services in order to 
improve the management of MRSA patients. The majority of activities were interactive 
telephone conversions where advice was given.  
People called the helpdesk for clarification on medical issues, but also they also called the 
helpdesk looking for emotional support, with the expressed intent of gaining confirmation, 
reassurance and clarification in frightening, disturbing or upsetting situations. The helpdesk 
took care of the patients or caller: follow up calls, referral suggestions, consultations with other 
professionals on behalf of the caller were all found to be important parts of the helpdesk's 
activities. The importance of these more social elements of calls was reflected in increasing 
appreciation resulting in repeat calls and explicit expression of gratitude.  
 
Media triggers 
The mass media is an important information channel and raises awareness in most parts of the 
population. In our analysis, its impact was seen most among private people. This is an 
interesting finding that requires further investigations regarding the hypothesis that population 
groups with relatively little knowledge react more easily and people with more expert 
knowledge are more resilient to media coverage. This investigation could help design risk 
communication activities that aim at preventing ‘media hypes’.  
The analysis of the helpdesk data does show that there appear to be transient increases in call 
frequency following media coverage. However, both the pattern of information needs and call 
triggers remain the same over the observed period of time, suggesting there is persistent interest 
and consequent information needs among professional groups and members of the public.  
 
Limitations 
This analysis has a number of limitations. It is a quantitative re-analysis of an existing database 
where the categories were developed independently from the research questions. Therefore, 
only a limited spectrum of quantitative data could be used for the analysis.  
The original data lacked some information that would have been important to look at: neither 
the duration of the calls, nor the names of the callers, or the person who answered the call were 
recorded. Therefore, we could not elaborate any insights into different outcomes, such as longer 
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calls, more repeats, more referrals, etc. As a result of our investigation we suggest the inclusion 
of further categories such as activities of the helpdesk, feedback of the callers, duration of call, 
etc. to the dataset.  
The qualitative approach was a convenient selective content analysis that helped to clarify 
questions that came up during the quantitative analysis (“Why did people call the helpdesk?”). 
Qualitative research could reveal more insight into the softer parts of the communication 
interactions and should be investigated further.  
 
Conclusion  
Social role of information: information hotline vs. helpdesk 
Despite the fact that the majority of information requested is widely available on the internet, 
in leaflets (for patients and relatives), textbooks and further training material for health care 
professionals, both health care professionals and private individuals regularly contacted the 
helpdesk. There are two possible explanations: first, the main reason for calling is not 
information, but the social role and function the helpdesk provides represented in an interactive 
conversation and possible further communication services (follow ups, consultants, referrals, 
etc.). Second, the information that is widely available is not sufficient; background or context-
related information and knowledge or experience is also needed in order to understand the 
situation and information given. Both explanations seem to be relevant for our research 
questions and point to a need for further research.  
Knowledge and communication gaps seem to be a problem that is most apparent for private 
individuals. Distressing experiences with healthcare professionals appear to leave them with 
no, incorrect or confusing information regarding further management and hence insufficient 
explanations being cited as a common reason to contact the helpdesk. Further research needs 
to be undertaken to investigate whether there are systemic failures in education and training 
for professionals, and how to improve ways to respond to these knowledge communication 
gaps.  
The activities provided by the helpdesk point to the conceptual understanding of the role of 
information and communication in the management of infectious patients. Information and 
communication is not only about the scientific facts; it is an important social activity in terms 
of relationship building. Offering a human interaction, putting patients in contact with a 
recommended and known expert/colleague; following up, contacting and discussing matters 
on behalf of the caller, all these activities are major elements of effective risk communication.  
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Further research needs to be done to establish a framework to better understand the role and 
function of risk communication in public health. 
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3. RISK COMMUNICATION OF ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: The Role of Clinical Practice, 
Regulation and Other Policies in Five European Countries in regards to MRSA20 
 
Abstract 
Background: The threat posed by Meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) has 
taken on an increasingly pan European dimension. This article aims to provide an overview of 
the different approaches to the control of MRSA adopted in five European countries (Austria, 
Germany, Netherlands, Spain and the UK) and discusses data and reporting mechanisms, 
regulations, guidelines and health policy approaches with a focus on risk communication.  
Our hypothesis is that current infection control practices in different European countries are 
implicit messages that contribute to the health-related risk communication and subsequently to 
the public perception of risk posed by MRSA. 
A reporting template was used to systematically collect information from each country. 
Discussion: Large variation in approaches was observed between countries. However, there 
were a number of consistent themes relevant to the communication of key information 
regarding MRSA including misleading messages, inconsistencies in content and application of 
published guidelines, and frictions between the official communication and their adoption on 
provider level. 
Summary: The variability of recommendations within, and across, countries could be 
contributing to the perception of inconsistency. Having inconsistent guidelines and practices 
in place may also be affecting the level at which recommended behaviours are adopted. The 
discrepancy between the official, explicit health messages around MRSA and the implicit 
messages stemming from the performance of infection control measures should therefore be a 
key target for those wishing to improve risk communication.  
  
Keywords: MRSA, healthcare associated infections (HCAI), Risk communication, Infection 
control, Health policy 
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Background  
Healthcare associated infections (HCAIs) place a significant burden on health systems in terms 
of both morbidity and mortality, and their effects are felt far beyond just those utilising 
healthcare services [1]. An already serious situation is now being exacerbated by the growth of 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria, such as meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). 
MRSA is a bacterium which is resistant to ß-lactam antibiotics, a group of antibiotic treatments 
which includes penicillin and cephalosporin. Infection with MRSA can lead to a variety of 
sequelae, including ventilator-associated pneumonia, chronic wound infection, bloodstream 
infection (bacteraemia) and septic conditions, which in some circumstances can lead to death.  
 
The prevalence of MRSA varies across Europe, with a general trend of increasing prevalence 
from north to the south [2-4]. The reasons for these observed differences are not yet fully 
understood, although variation in prevention and control strategies [5], design of healthcare 
facilities [6], staff to patient ratios [7], patterns of antibiotic usage [8] and the implementation 
of antibiotic stewardship [9, 10] are thought to be contributing factors. As travel between 
European states becomes more common, with citizens free, within certain limits, to pursue 
elective treatment in a European country other than their own, the scope for transmission of 
infectious pathogens to areas where they are not endemic becomes ever greater [11, 12]. 
Therefore, cross border regions now face a particular challenge in coping with patients coming 
from neighbouring countries where different regulations and practices are in place to prevent, 
detect and respond to infectious agents [13]. The rise of MRSA and the European cross border 
health care legislation to allow treatment in another EU country have led to the formation of a 
number of MRSA networks, founded on bilateral agreements between countries with shared 
borders about how best to manage the issues outlined above [14]. 
 
Increases in the burden associated with HCAIs and the growth of antimicrobial resistance have 
led to heightened awareness both within the lay population and among politicians [15]. The 
Chief Medical Officer in the UK has even gone so far as to place the threat posed by 
antimicrobial resistant on a par with that of terrorism [16]. The European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) has placed the “Antimicrobial Resistance and Healthcare-
associated Infections Programme” among its top priorities for the future [17]. The ECDC has 
also stated that a major part of the problem stems from deficiencies in the way health related 
issues are communicated, and has encouraged EU member states to improve their risk 
communication strategies [18].  
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Risk communication is a wide and multi-faceted field, and is considered an important approach 
in the fight against the spread of infectious diseases through the impact it can have on the 
adoption of appropriate behaviours e.g. frequent hand washing to limit carriage and infection 
[19]. Recent research has highlighted a number of areas which are key to understanding 
effective risk communication, such as the nature and quality of information provided to patients 
and health care workers [20], patients’ and the general public's perceived information needs 
[21, 22] and role of the media [23]. However, little research has been carried out into the impact 
of institutional arrangements on specific communication strategies [24].   
We conceptualise risk communication as not simply explicit communications, but also the 
implicit messages of institutional arrangements (differences in policies, inconsistencies of 
implementation, etc.). In order to test this assumption, we examined the implementation of 
various MRSA policies across five European countries for any evidence that environmental 
factors contribute as implicit and ‘autonomous’ risk communication next to traditional explicit 
and ‘voluntary’ forms.  
The article begins by discussing the situation in each of the countries with regards to the 
following areas, while reflecting on the underlying epidemiological rationale for each:  
! Data and reporting mechanisms, 
! Regulations and guidelines, 
! Health policy approaches with a focus on risk communication, and 
! Implicit messages of current practices. 
 
In the second section, we move on to discuss how different national strategies to contain MRSA 
infection are implicit ‘messages’ and contribute to explicit risk communication strategies.  
 
Methods 
We collected information on the situation with regards to MRSA in five European countries 
until 2011: Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and the UK. These countries were chosen as 
they represent varying prevalence, response strategies, overall health system organization and 
modes of communication.  
 
A template was designed to systematically collect information about five areas: 1) data 
collection and reporting mechanisms; 2) the regulatory framework; 3) clinical guideline design; 
4) implementation of guidelines and 5) other relevant health policy measures. The intended 
and unintended effects of policies in each of these categories were then compared to explicit 
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communication strategies first by country, and then across countries. Information was drawn 
from scientific and grey literature and complemented, where necessary, by stakeholder 
interviews.  
 
To help interpret the results, and how the various measures compare to one another, we 
developed a stepwise classification for different stages of MRSA (see Table 1).  
 
Level I Colonisation MRSA can be found on the skin, in the nasal cavity or in a wound. 
The colonisation itself is not an ostensible health problem; 
however, it can lead to an acute infection and most importantly 
MRSA is contagious from the level of colonisation on. Healthy 
people are still healthy with MRSA colonisation, but could spread 
the bacterium to others. For ill people MRSA colonisation could 
lead to an infection with the bacterium. With an easy and non-
invasive swab the colonisation can be identified. A proven 
colonisation can be sanitised with antibiotic cream and antiseptic 
washings. 
Level II Infection MRSA is on the skin or in the nasal cavities or in wounds and 
causing a reaction from the immune system e.g. inflammation, 
antibodies, fever, etc. The infection can be proven by a blood test 
showing the systemic signs of an immune system reaction and the 
bacterium be found locally in the infection area. Patients with a 
compromised immune system or with skin problem are more 
susceptible to developing MRSA infections than healthy people.  
Level III Bacteraemia Bacteria can be found in the bloodstream. In combination with 
clinical symptoms this is called sepsis. A septic condition is a 
serious, life threatening medical condition. Bacteraemia is proven 
by a blood sample where bacteria can be found. A blood test for 
bacteraemia is only performed when medically indicated e.g. a 
patients developing a septic clinical condition.  
Table 1 Classification of MRSA from an infection control perspective 
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Results  
We present narratively a summary of results; the details can be found in table 2.  
 
Data situation 
Of the five countries, three countries have mandatory reporting (Germany, Netherlands and 
UK) while the other (Austria and Spain) report on a voluntary basis. Only the Netherlands 
report MRSA from colonisation level onwards; the majority of countries (Austria, Germany, 
Spain, UK) only report bacteraemia (level III), which is the most serious consequence of 
infection and only present in a minority of cases. The UK, however, also screen for MRSA 
status prior to elective surgery, but this information is not officially reported. There is no 
consistent information about the “contagious burden”, meaning the provision of information 
about colonisation and infections, from level I on where MRSA is contagious and can be passed 
to others [25].  
 
Regulatory bodies 
Regulatory bodies are built based on the political structure of the country where they are based. 
In Austria, Germany and Spain health care provision and management is in the responsibility 
of federal states or autonomous communities. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom follow 
a national approach.  
 
Guidelines 
The Netherlands has opted to pursue an active screening policy (“search & destroy”). Risk-
based testing is in place in Austria, Germany, Spain and the UK, with the UK requiring 
screening of elective admissions to hospitals. Isolation practice for positive cases is basically 
the same in the five countries. However, the time lag between entering the hospital and being 
identified as MRSA carrier is critical as a variety of admission procedures, examinations and 
clinical investigations at the beginning of a hospital stay increase the likelihood to spread 
infectious diseases. The Netherlands, again, stand out by placing patients with an unknown 
MRSA status in isolation rooms; Spain places patients awaiting their results in isolation as well 
as, whenever possible (individual room availability), those who are previous carriers or high-
risk patients (in one autonomous community Catalonia). 
Healthcare workers in the four countries (Austria, Germany, Spain, UK) are not screened on a 
regular basis, meaning that those who are a high risk group in every countries’ guidelines and 
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work where the contracting and spread of infectious disease occurs most readily are unaware 
of their own MRSA status [26]. The Netherlands screen staff regularly.  
 
Implementation 
All countries investigated have put legal obligations in place to implement their guidelines. 
However, only sporadic, if any, verifications and checks are being carried out.  
 
Health policy 
All the countries under investigation have increased their awareness for MRSA and have 
developed national action plans, regional and international networks of hospitals and 
laboratories, antibiotic stewardship, strengthened their legislation and created incentives to 
reduce the prevalence of MRSA [9].  
 
Communication 
Information and knowledge play a crucial role in the management of MRSA, and European 
health policy also puts special attention on communication. All five countries thus prioritise 
the provision of information to various target groups (health professionals, patients and general 
public). 
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 Austria Germany Netherlands Spain (Catalonia – 
autonomous 
community/AC) 
United Kingdom 
Reporting 
Situation 
Mandatory 
reporting 
(frequency; 
Level I = 
Colonisation, 
Level II = 
Infection, level 
III = 
Bacteraemia)  
Register 
No mandatory 
reporting  
- Voluntary basis for 
hospitals (level III) 
- Annual reporting of 
routine laboratory 
data (level III) 
- Only one federal 
states has a registry 
 
Mandatory: Quarterly 
reporting of bacteraemia 
(level III) to the Robert 
Koch Institute (RKI) 
(since 07/2009) 
- Voluntary: Point 
prevalence information 
of infections (level II) 
- No information on 
colonization (level I) 
Mandatory 
reporting of level I-
III 
- Samples of bacteria 
strains (level I and II) 
sent to RIVM for 
classification 
 
 
No mandatory reporting 
- Unified surveillance 
program (VINCat 
program): Annual 
collection of MRSA ratio, 
incidence and bacteraemia 
(level III) information 
Mandatory weekly 
reporting of bacteraemia 
(level III) since April 2004 
- Mandatory reporting of 
MRSA mortality  
Regulatory 
bodies 
Name 
Role: Issue 
guidelines; 
control 
implementation 
Federal approach 
- There is a basic 
national legal 
framework*, but 
each of the nine 
federal states has 
their own laws. 
Federal approach with 
national guidance 
- RKI on national level. 
Health is in the 
responsibility of the 16 
federal states, thus a 
commission has been 
National approach 
-Ministry of Health, 
Welfare and Sports 
-Netherlands 
Institute for public 
health and the 
environment (RIVM) 
Regional approach 
- Public Health 
Directorate in the Public 
Health Agency 
Hospital networks have 
established nosocomial 
National approach 
- England: Care Quality 
Commission (CQC) as laid 
down by the Health and 
Social Care Act 2008; 
Foundation trusts have their 
!
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Impact 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Each Hospital 
develops its own 
infection control 
plan 
 
* Hospitals and 
Medical Institutions 
Act/Krankenanstalte
n- und 
Kuranstaltengesetz  
established at the RKI 
representing the federal 
states (Commission for 
Hospital hygiene and 
Preventions of 
Infections/KRINKO). 
- German Society for 
Hospital Hygiene 
advises KRINKO 
- While KRINKO 
releases 
recommendations for 
the federal states, the 
German Protection 
Infection Act (IfSG) 
provides the legal 
framework for infection 
control in Germany on 
national level 
-Health Council of 
the Netherland (GR) 
-The Health Care 
Inspectorate (IGZ)  
-The Dutch Working 
Party on Infection 
Prevention (WIP) 
infection control 
programme (VINCat). 
- All regulations apply for 
regional level. 
own independent regulator 
known as Monitor 
- Scotland: Social Care and 
Social Work Improvement 
Scotland (SCSWIS) and 
Healthcare Improvement 
Scotland (HIS) 
- Wales: Health 
Inspectorate for Wales 
(HIW), created in 2004, 
and the Care and Social 
Services Inspectorate for 
Wales (CSSIW) 
- NI: Regulation and 
Quality Improvement 
Authority (RQIA) 
Guidelines 
Basic principles 
 
Guidelines: Each 
hospital has its own 
guideline but all 
refer to the 
Guidelines: German 
antibiotic resistance 
strategy (DART) 
Guidelines: “Search 
and destroy” since 
1986 
 
Guidelines: Consensus 
Document: unify 
treatment of MRSA 
infection by a set of 
Guidelines: The Health and 
Social Care Act (2008) 
Code of Practice for the 
NHS on the prevention and 
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recommendations by 
Institute of 
Microbiology of 
Universities.  
 
Principle 
- risk-based testing 
of known or highly 
likely patients 
- Isolation after 
positive test results 
 
 
KRINKO/RKI 
recommendations 
(Versions: 1999, 2005, 
2011) 
 
Principle 
Risk-based testing of 
known or highly likely 
MRSA patients 
- Isolation when tested 
positive until three 
negative swaps  
- Barrier nursing for 
HCW 
- Interventions in MRSA 
patients should be 
restricted to those 
deemed absolutely 
necessary  
- No routine screening 
for patients or staff 
 
 
 
 
 
Principle  
Search: Active 
screening of patients 
and staff 
Destroy: 
decolonisation and 
treatment based on 
guidelines developed 
by Dutch Working 
Party on Antibiotic 
Policy (SWAB) 
- Isolation based on 
risk assessment from 
first contact on 
evidence based 
recommendations 
 
 
 
Principle 
- risk-based testing (nasal 
swabs) 
- Isolation for positive and 
waiting for results 
patients 
control of healthcare 
associated infections: risk 
of infection posed to 
patients is kept to a 
minimum 
Principle 
- 10 registration criteria for 
the prevention and control, 
such as information, clean 
environment, identification 
of infected patients, 
isolation facilities 
- As of 2008 screening of 
high-risk cohorts, in 
particular A&E admissions 
and pre-operative surgical 
assessment patients 
- As of April 2009 all 
elective admissions must be 
screened for MRSA 
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Implementatio
n  
Routine 
Consequences 
 
 
 
Legal obligation for 
hospitals to 
implement measure 
to assure hygiene 
quality  
- Federal states carry 
out regular checks 
(differ among federal 
states) 
Legal obligation for 
hospitals to implement 
measure to assure 
hygiene quality  
 
- Implementation has 
not been routinely 
controlled yet 
 
 
Legal obligation for 
hospitals to 
implement measure 
to assure hygiene 
quality. 
- Implementation 
controlled by the 
Health Care 
Inspectorate 
Legal: Infectious diseases 
committees are mandatory 
in the public network of 
hospitals in Catalonia 
- Implementation 
controlled by The 
Catalonian Health 
Department, throughout 
periodic accreditation 
processes 
Legal obligation: Deadline 
for implementation no later 
than 2011 
 
-Implementation assessed 
by the Care Quality 
Commission 
Health Policy 
National Action 
Plan 
Regional 
Networks 
Antibiotic 
Stewardship 
 
- Quality Committee 
to contribute to the 
development of 
quality management 
- Networks: National 
Reference Centre for 
Nosocomial 
Infections and 
Antibiotics 
Resistance 
- National Action 
Plan and a National 
Antimicrobial 
- New Infection 
Protection Act regarding 
nosocomial infections (9 
June 2011). 
The law is mandatory for 
all 16 Länder and the 
changes have to be 
implemented by 31 
March 2012.  
Key points:  
- Hygiene Commission 
ART: a commission for 
“anti-infectiva resistance 
The Dutch Working 
Party on Infection 
Prevention (WIP) 
EUREGIO Twente-
Muensterland MRSA 
network 
EurSafety Health Net, 
MRSA networks for 
the Euroegio Meuse 
Rhine, Rhine-Meuse-
Nord, Rhine-Waal, 
Gronau-Enschede, 
Ems-Dollert regio. 
- Some quality indicators 
(prevalence of nosocomial 
infection) are incorporated 
into incentive policies 
among professionals as 
part of the “Management 
by Objectives” approach. 
Actors involved in MRSA 
policies are: local 
infection control 
committees, infection 
control nurse, consultant 
in infectious diseases, 
Health Protection Agency  
- collects routine 
surveillance data on 
infection rates, provides 
training and specialist 
advice on ways to deal with 
infections 
 - acts as a conduit for the 
sharing of information 
between  providers.  
- works with the general 
public to ensure key 
information on the threats 
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Strategy is currently 
being developed 
- Antibiotic 
Stewardship 
European Networks  
and therapy” (ART) is to 
be established with 
diagnostic and treatment 
list 
- Joint Federal 
Committee 
“Gemeinsamer 
Bundesausschuss” 
releases guidelines to 
hygiene and quality 
management 
- Sanitation: The 
outpatient sanitation of 
MRSA patients should 
be reimbursed better for 
GPs to motivate them to 
follow up the treatment 
of MRSA outpatients. 
- Strong hospital 
network especially in 
cross border regions, e.g. 
EUREGIO 
Twente/Münsterland 
microbiologist and clinical 
staff 
posed by infections is easily 
accessible 
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Explicit 
communication 
Information 
policy 
Key messages 
 
- Each hospital 
creates their own 
guidelines, adapted 
to their specific 
circumstances and 
based on the hygiene 
regulations 
enshrined by law and 
the 
recommendations 
published by the 
responsible scientific 
institutions at 
universities 
- Dissemination of 
information for 
patients and visitors 
in an ad-hoc way 
- In general, little 
media attention 
regarding MRSA 
KRINKO guidelines 
point out that 
information and 
communication is key to 
successfully respond to 
the health threat posed 
by MRSA 
- Information and 
communication needs 
have not been 
investigated or 
recommended in the 
new guidelines 
- Information is 
available at hospitals 
and nursing homes 
- Information for the 
general public, 
hospital staff and 
policy makers about 
MRSA is available 
through the MRSA 
network described 
above 
 
- Information available 
for health professionals, 
patients and general 
public 
- Two of the ten criteria in 
the Code of Practice for the 
NHS on the prevention and 
control of healthcare 
associated infections relate 
specifically to the provision 
of information 
 
- Despite the laws and 
effort surrounding 
improving information the 
results have been mixed.  
 
Table 2: Overview of results in five EU countries  
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Discussion 
We first comment the results of the five countries, then discuss the epidemiological 
rationale and the implication for risk communication.  
 
Situation in the five countries  
Reporting  
Comprehensive data on prevalence is difficult to obtain as most mandatory and 
voluntary surveillance systems were found to only cover MRSA bacteraemia. Point 
prevalence studies and surveys that have attempted to capture the situation have also 
been based on information provided by hospitals on a voluntary basis. This has 
contributed to the sporadic nature of evidence around MRSA and thus current data does 
not appropriately reflect the ubiquitous nature of the treat of infection [3]. 
Moving the reporting downstream with the reporting of bacteraemia, level III, is 
posited to be one way to keep the absolute numbers down. In regards to communication, 
this contributes to keeping perception of infection rates artificially low. This could be 
appealing to policy makers as the small numbers reported cause less concern than if the 
prevalence of infection were to be revealed [27-29]. It is, however, only an artefact of 
the reporting – and not reflective of the underlying epidemiology of the infectious 
disease. 
 
Regulatory bodies 
Having different regulatory bodies could possibly lead to variability in terms of 
guidelines and recommendations and their implementation. The variability of 
recommendations within and across countries could contribute to the perception of 
inconsistency.  
 
Guidelines 
The rigor of infection control is not appropriately reflected in the guidelines: MRSA 
patients are constantly contagious and not only after identification; healthcare workers 
fall under the risk groups for screening in every country, but are, with the exception of 
the Netherlands, not screened.  
 
Implementation 
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Concerns about the implementation of the guidelines are frequently raised. Surveys 
from Germany and the UK support these findings. The authors showed that a minority 
of the hospitals have consistently implemented guidelines [30-31]. 
 
Health policy 
The consistent adoption of policy in the guidelines and the implementation into the 
daily practice is, however, subject to discussion. The gap between the policy and its 
implementation is not just a medical problem, but also influences the perception of 
health risks, and could affect compliance with the intended behaviour [32]. 
 
Communication  
The explicit information strategy is only one aspect of communication  (“voluntary 
communication”); another aspect is how messages that are expressed in the official 
statements are ‘executed’ on the ground of the daily reality of health care (“autonomous 
communication”). Infection control measures, their implementation into the medical 
environment and their frictions are tacit acts of communication yet little attention has 
been spent on how to monitor and improve the way they contribute to the conveyance 
of key health messages. 
 
Epidemiological rationale  
Infection control approach 
There are, generally speaking, two basic strategies for responding to infectious diseases 
that emerge from the analysis: a ‘specific’ and a ‘general’ approach. 
The specific approach relies on the identification of those patients already infected with 
MRSA. Once an MRSA patient is identified and known (‘red flagged’), appropriate 
measures can be taken. These measures range from sanitation of skin colonisation 
and/or treatment of the infection. The patient should also be isolated from the hospital 
environment in order to prevent the transmission of the pathogen. Once an MRSA 
patient has been identified, health care workers have to wear personal protection 
equipment and apply stringent hygiene measures. The MRSA patient’s room is often 
labelled with a sign signalling the contagious status. There is a general consensus 
regarding isolation and hygiene practices. However, the crucial choice of strategy for 
identification in the specific approach is controversial. Only the Netherlands has a pro-
active screening policy; all of the other countries studied used a process of reactive 
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screening based on risk assessment, with the UK also requiring pre-hospital screening 
for elective admissions. Hospitals across the four ‘reactive’ EU countries (Austria, 
Germany, Spain, UK) appear very reluctant to screen patients for a number of reasons. 
One is that the care for and treatment of MRSA patients places greater demands on the 
attending nurses and clinicians, meaning that there could be an incentive to avoid 
correct MRSA classification. Additional measures such as spatial requirements (single 
isolation rooms), differential treatment guidelines, and consequences for staff and ward 
routines aggravate the situation. Also at the hospital level it ostensibly requires more 
time and resources to care for MRSA patients and therefore those facing budgetary 
pressure may possibly be more inclined to avoid diagnosis, despite the fact that the 
costs of cases progressing to bacteraemia may outweigh the costs of an active screening 
policy [33-37]. 
If contagious patients are not identified, a ‘general’ approach with stringent measures 
to guarantee good hygiene has to be adhered to by all healthcare workers, patients and 
visitors. This system of infection control includes, among others, requirements such as 
strict hand hygiene, regular cleaning and disinfection of surfaces. To promote the 
general hygiene approach good communication is crucial to ensure that everyone is 
aware of what they need to do in order to avoid infection and stop further spread. 
Frictions between infection management and communication could affect the adoption 
of the recommended behaviour.  
 
Ethical Problems 
The handling for MRSA patients raises some ethical questions regarding whether there 
is equal treatment of isolated and contagious patients. The restriction of physical 
transport and transfer forms part of the infection control recommendations in the 
European countries investigated. However, it is an increasingly controversial and 
sensitive aspect of the prescribed treatment of MRSA patients as many feel it could 
compromise the quality of clinical care [38]. Most guidelines recommend that some 
invasive interventions be confined to the room used by MRSA patients [39]. In the case 
where interventions performed in the patient’s room would be better carried out 
elsewhere, the lack of an optimal environment could lead to reduced performance on 
the part of clinicians. Infectious patients are put at the end of the day’s surgery schedule 
and are more likely to be postponed due to emergencies in the surgical programme. The 
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avoidance of invasive diagnostics alongside being the “last operation on the schedule” 
could comprise the medical treatment of an often critically ill patient.  
 
Organisational Aspects 
MRSA is also an occupational health problem. Healthcare workers are not routinely 
screened for MRSA colonisation or infection - apart from in the Netherlands. This 
reluctance to identify infectious staff could be seen in the context of healthcare 
organisation. If a staff member is colonised with MRSA they are not allowed to work 
in their usual locations. This poses a burden to the workplace organisation in terms of 
the potential for inconsistent labour supply, in particular in an already overstretched 
working environment. Hospitals and countries in which the intensive care unit (ICU) 
carer/nurse to patient ratio is 1:1 report basically no problems of nosocomial infections 
[40]. This adds weight to the hypothesis that a major contributor to increasing 
prevalence of MRSA is the high patient-healthcare worker-ratio [41].  
 
Architecture 
The guidelines also point out the importance of spatial distancing and the role of 
architecture – a challenge which has not been met by modern hospitals and it remains 
unclear whether this concern regarding the spread of infectious disease will be met in 
the future [6]. 
 
Risk communication strategy 
The ‘general’ approach i.e. the basic tools for fighting an infectious disease epidemic, 
all feature prominently in all national guidelines: knowledge, training, information, 
networks and collaboration. But the question remains of how well are the 
recommendations implemented at the provider levels especially in terms of their risk 
communication practices.  
 
Conflicting messages 
From a patient perspective, the discharge of MRSA patients is an ostensibly 
incongruent routine. After being treated in strict isolation and under a stringent hygiene 
regimen – patients are simply discharged and informed that MRSA is no risk for healthy 
people [42]. This dissonance could lead to confusion and distress for patients, relatives 
and visitors and adds further to potential misperceptions of their health risk to others.  
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Knowledge  
Despite the laws and efforts surrounding improving information and communication, 
knowledge levels have been mixed. The lack of knowledge in healthcare professionals 
is seen as an influencing factor for increasing prevalence of nosocomial infections [43-
46].  
 
Risk communication policy  
The risk communication policies of the five EU countries were found to contain only 
information relating to risks faced by people directly involved in healthcare, such as 
hospital staff and patients. These policies were based on the same risk assessment that 
is used to determine which patients should be screened for MRSA. It focuses on 
healthcare workers, long term care, chronically ill patients and patients facing surgery. 
There has only been little effort to address MRSA as problem in and for the general 
population [47]. This narrow view is congruent with the lack of concern for the role of 
other factors, such as behaviour, implementation of guidelines, etc., seen in other areas.  
 
Media Coverage 
The consensus in the literature is that the UK media coverage, especially within the 
tabloid newspapers, has been at times sensationalist. However, the pressure placed on 
governments in response to the extensive media coverage has played a significant role 
in a number of policy changes which have contributed to the decline in incidence of 
deaths and bacteraemia associated with MRSA [48-49].  
 
Public Perception  
The infection threat posed by MRSA is difficult to communicate. Researchers have 
blamed contradicting risk communication about necessary hygienic measures as one 
problem [50]. They see that even necessary cleaning routines have not been 
implemented in hygiene plans [50]. More importantly, risk communication messages 
might have influenced the risk perception of healthcare workers, patients and the public 
inappropriately. The message that MRSA is not an infectious diseases agent which can 
lead to outbreaks outside of healthcare facilities and also does not do harm to family 
members has direct consequences for the epidemiology of MRSA, and could in turn 
have led to the perception that MRSA is a harmless pathogen only affecting those who 
are already ill [42]. 
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Summary 
The data situation in the countries is patchy at best, and thus it is difficult to offer up 
any firm conclusions regarding the overall burden of disease in the countries studied. 
What is clear, however, is that knowledge and information about the infectious disease 
burden is limited in the general population, and this lack of clarity has led to a growth 
in misconceptions surrounding the threat of MRSA. 
   
The variability of recommendations within, and across, countries could be contributing 
to the perception of inconsistency and therefore this should be looked, potentially as 
part of a wider strategy designed to improve risk communication. Having inconsistent 
guidelines and practices in place may also be affecting the level at which recommended 
behaviours are adopted. This is an area that would require more research.  
 
The risk communication of MRSA has several weaknesses: there are misleading 
messages in the official statements and a gap between the official communications and 
guidelines, with inconsistent adoption of the latter at the provider level.  
This discrepancy between the official, explicit health messages around MRSA and the 
implicit messages stemming from the performance of infection control measures should 
therefore be a key target for those wishing to improve the accuracy of perceptions 
regarding the health risks of MRSA.  
 
Recommendation 
The increasing burden of antimicrobial resistance and health care associated infections 
has been reflected in growing public awareness, for example with major health policy 
organisations urging countries to improve their risk communication and MRSA 
prevention strategies. These ought to be revised to also address the general public. Thus 
far, most countries have adopted a universal risk-based approach addressing affected 
groups, without differentiating between groups, or addressing the wider public. Health 
policy and practice has also focused on individual infection control measures and place 
the majority of responsibility on the individual. Organizational aspects 
(patient/healthcare worker ratios, architecture, etc.) have not been prominently 
discussed. The rational use of antibiotics and antibiotic stewardship is a significant 
move designed to place greater responsibility for the control of HCAIs on medical 
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professionals. However, the key message, often included in national risk 
communication strategies, that MRSA is a problem only for those who are already ill, 
is misleading. In fact, MRSA is a problem affecting society as a whole. MRSA is a 
problem for healthy people as they can transmit the disease; MRSA is a problem for 
treating too many patients in too narrow spaces. MRSA is a problem because MRSA 
patients are only reluctantly identified. And finally, MRSA is a problem because the 
explicit and implicit messages of MRSA are often inconsistent if not contradictory.  
The problem of health care related infections and antimicrobial resistance can only be 
tackled in a more holistic approach regarding reconsideration of affected groups, 
healthcare organisation, architecture and a rational use of antibiotics – and by revising 
a risk communication strategy accordingly.  
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III. Strategy for risk communication governance in public health 
BIOLOGICAL RISKS TO PUBLIC HEALTH – lessons from an international 
conference to inform the development of national risk communication 
strategies 
Report of an international conference on risk communication strategies before, during 
and after public health emergencies, Rabat, Morocco, 22-23 October 201521 
 
Abstract  
Biological risk management in public health focuses on the impact of outbreaks on 
health, economy and other systems and ensuring biosafety and biosecurity. To address 
this broad range of risks, the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) request from 
all member states to build defined core capacities, risk communication being one of 
them. While there is existing guidance on the communication process and on what 
health authorities need to consider to design risk communication strategies that meet 
the requirements on a governance level, little is done on implementation due to a 
number of factors including lack of resources (human, financial and others), and 
systems to support effective and consistent capacity for risk communication. The 
international conference on “Risk communication strategies before, during and after 
public health emergencies” provided a platform to present current strategies, facilitate 
learning from recent outbreaks of infectious diseases and to discuss recommendations 
to inform risk communication strategy development. The discussion concluded four 
key areas of improvements in risk communication: consider communication as a 
multidimensional process in risk communication, broaden the biomedical paradigm by 
integrating social science intelligence into epidemiological risk assessments, strengthen 
multisectoral collaboration including with local organizations, and spearhead changes 
in own organisations for better risk communication governance. National strategies 
should design risk communication to be proactive, participatory, multisectoral, 
facilitating the connection between sectors and strengthening collaboration.  
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Introduction 
Background 
Biological risks pose challenges to public health. These risks can be naturally occurring 
disease outbreaks at national and international levels, accidental exposure to pathogens 
in the context of biomedical diagnostics and research or intentional use of pathogens 
for harmful purposes. Biological risk management focuses on these following three 
areas of: 
iv) The preparedness for the impact of naturally occurring disease outbreaks on 
national or international scale on individual and public health, national and 
international economy, social and other systems;  
v) Biosafety as understood by the UN as “principles, technologies, practices and 
measures implemented to prevent the accidental release of, or unintentional 
exposure to pathogenic agents.”1  
vi) Biosecurity which refers to the “protection, control and accountability 
measures implemented to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional 
release of pathogenic agents and related resources as well as unauthorized 
access to, retention or transfer of such material.”1 
The World Health Organization has recognised the importance of biological risks to 
public health and has updated its International Health Regulations (IHR) in 2005 to 
ensure that all member states build their capacities to prevent, detect, respond to and 
recover from biological and other defined risks to public health and ensure to minimise 
the impact on trade and travel (IHR 2005).2 
Public health authorities have worked on technical areas to mitigate biological risks, 
such as improving disease surveillance systems and laboratory capacities.3 The IHR 
(2005) also stress the importance of risk governance in the management of public health 
events and has broadened the understanding of risk communication as a core capacity 
under the IHR (2005). While in a conventional understanding risk communication was 
seen as a technical process to inform the public what to do in times of a health crisis, 
the current understanding of risk communication is defined by the WHO as “a multi-
level and multi-faceted process, which aims to help stakeholders define risks, identify 
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hazards, assess vulnerabilities and promote community resilience, thereby promoting 
the capacity to cope with an unfolding public health emergency.”4 This broader 
understanding of risk communication moves beyond a common understanding that 
limits risk communication to a timely conveyance of information about health risks to 
a public. It considers risk communication not as a technical expertise in communication 
but rather as a strategic activity supporting the management of public health risks by 
bringing in social science expertise. This transformation process, thus, requires from 
national public health agencies to re-think their current risk communication strategies 
and plans. Addressing this new challenge, national public health agencies have little 
guidance in developing their national risk communication strategies. There is some 
evidence on how to improve the communication process in a crisis5-7 or for particular 
situations, e.g. public health emergencies8, high security laboratories9, during an 
Influenza pandemic10 or more generically to evaluate biosafety and biosecurity from a 
risk communication perspective11. There is also a growing body of literature that elicits 
the information needs of the general public, e.g. after biosecurity events12,13 or 
infectious disease outbreaks14 or particular at-risk groups. While these are very helpful 
in meeting specific communication requirements they mostly focus on the information 
needs of the public and thus remain in the conventional understanding of risk 
communication as the timely conveyance of information from experts to a lay 
population. 
But what are the institutional and strategic steps public health authorities need to take 
to ensure the multi-level, multifaceted process of risk communication at an 
organisational level – what do public health authorities need to do and consider when 
developing risk communication strategies? 
To tackle this question, an international high-level conference on “risk communication 
strategies before, during and after public health emergencies” was held in Rabat, 
Morocco, on 22-23 October 2015, which was organised within the framework of the 
German Partnership Program for Excellence in Biological and Health Security financed 
by the German Federal Foreign Office. The conference provided a platform to present 
current risk communication strategies, learn from recent outbreaks of infectious 
diseases, particularly the Ebola virus disease, and to discuss recommendations with an 
international audience. This article summarises the presentations and discussions from 
the conference and concludes with recommendations that inform the development of 
national risk communication strategies in Morocco and Tunisia.  
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Conference 
The high-level conference was organised by the Directorate for Epidemiology (DELM) 
within the Moroccan Ministry of Health, together with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, and aimed to inform a project that 
supports the Moroccan and Tunisian Ministries of Health in the development of 
national risk communication strategies. The conference was attended by key 
stakeholders from Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan and featured contributions from 
international experts and partners (WHO HQ, EMRO, and country office, International 
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), GIZ, Robert Koch 
Institute (RKI), international airports).  
The conference followed the logical sequence of introducing the international 
legislative framework (IHR and Public Health Emergencies of International Concern 
(PHEIC)), eliciting learnings from a recent PHEIC (the Ebola outbreak in in West 
Africa), including the anthropological perspective from West Africa, learning from a 
national outbreak (Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (STEC) in Germany) and international 
airports (Casablanca and Frankfurt) as points of entry in order to stimulate thinking and 
discussion on risk communication strategies. A concluding panel discussed and 
summarised key recommendations.  
 
International legislative framework – lessons from the Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa 
The International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) provide the legislative framework for 
Member States to build and strengthen the eight core capacities, risk communication 
being one of them. Member state assess their capacities annually using an IHR self-
assessment monitoring framework and report their assessment to WHO. More recently, 
the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), together with international partners such 
as WHO, have developed a Joint External Evaluation tool (JEE) to map and assess the 
strengths and weaknesses in countries’ ability to prevent, detect and respond to 
infectious disease outbreaks in a collaborative approach using countries’ self 
assessment with an assessment by external experts to result in a joint evaluation of IHR 
capacities.15  
Public health events that can pose a threat to the international public health can be 
declared under the IHR as Public Health Emergencies of International Concern 
(PHEIC). The WHO Director General is in the position to declare a PHEIC following 
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the convening of an emergency committee of experts (IHR emergency committee). The 
declaration of a PHEIC facilitates international coordination and collaboration to 
respond to and mitigate the impact of this public health emergency. The Ebola outbreak 
in West Africa provided some opportunities to improve risk communication and WHO 
shared their reflections to inform the development of risk communication strategies: 
The East Mediterranean Regional Office (EMRO) of WHO reported on a 
comprehensive assessment requested by the World Health Assembly in 2015 to 
evaluate the capacities and capabilities of EMRO region in prevention of and response 
to a potential importation of Ebola virus disease into the region. This assessment 
identified a number of critical gaps: limited capacity for prevention, detection and 
response in the areas of leadership and coordination, surveillance, infection prevention 
and control, risk communication, points of entry, and laboratory diagnosis. The survey 
revealed that risk communication was not considered essential, few had communication 
plans and countries even voiced their reluctance to communicate as they felt it would 
create panic among the population. These results underlined the need for awareness 
raising and training to build a common understanding in the group of health 
professionals and to support the development of communication strategies and plans. 
This assessment also revealed a discrepancy between this Ebola assessment and the 
IHR assessment outcome that countries report to WHO and reinforces the findings of 
the IHR monitoring review to strengthen the IHR assessment tools from self-assessment 
to peer review and the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool.15-16  
WHO HQ reflected on the communication and coordination during the Ebola outbreak.  
The key learning was that “dissemination of information alone is useless and sometimes 
dangerous. We must listen and constantly adjust our strategies and approaches on the 
basis of people's concerns.” Starting point for the risk communication process is the 
perception of risks in the communities which is often different from the scientific 
assessment of risks. In order to gather and understand communities’ perception, 
interactions and engagement are necessary. This relationship building with 
communities is one of the key risk communication activities. Providing technical 
information is only one of the building blocks, along with values, credibility, expression 
of caring and most importantly trust. Trust is a key enabling factor for relationship 
building and engaging with communities. The IHR (2005) as legal framework to build 
and strengthen the capacity in risk communication provides the context and justification 
to start building relationships with communities before, during and after outbreaks. 
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At the height of the Ebola outbreak, many responders and stakeholders were already on 
the ground and coordination proved challenging. The collaboration with international 
partners, but in particular the communication with local communities provided 
opportunities for key insights: the dissemination of information alone (scientific facts) 
is not sufficient to build the relationship with local communities. In fact, a relationship 
and a solid degree of trust are imperative to collaborate on response and mitigation 
strategies and important parts of risk communication strategies that need to be 
integrated into the risk management process.   
The example of key messages on prevention and response revealed, once again, the gap 
between scientific risk assessments and the public perception of risks. The scientific 
advice to wash hands regularly or to not touch a sick person conflicted with social 
realities and cultural practices in affected communities. This scientific advice was 
simply not applicable and integrate-able into local realities and mind sets and even 
offended people. To not touch a sick person was considered in communities as 
unacceptable practice. This advice, though, resulted in communities to disbelief, 
growing distrust and even aggression towards to international and national health 
professionals. Messages have to be re-framed to make sense for the public. This is a 
process that should be informed by the scientific assessment as one source among 
others, such as social anthropology, psychology, etc. The community resistance to 
official health advice and rumours are in fact other important sources of information 
where risk communication has gone wrong. WHO HQ gave an example of the re-
labelling of an Ebola Isolation Centre into an Ebola Treatment Centre which helped the 
community to gain trust into the health facility. Rumours are in particular indicative for 
the strength and weakness of the current risk communication process: rumours need to 
be captured and deconstructed in order to improve the relation between health workers 
and communities. The rumour, for example, that there was trade of body parts and blood 
was understood as a lack of trust in the health system. In a collaborative analysis of this 
rumour, WHO partnering with health workers and community influencers have 
reconceptualised this lack of trust. Together they reframed the approach and stressed 
the importance of body integrity and working with health workers and community 
influencers as part of the communities.  
 The biggest learning point for WHO was, however, the extent of community 
engagement and understanding communities in order to establish relevant risk 
! 93 
communication activities. Being close, listening and responding to community’s 
concern is an approach now adopted more prominently in international organisations. 
WHO Communications: Communications is an integral part of public health response 
and serves multiple purposes: people have the legal right to be informed about risks and 
how to protect themselves. The aim of communications is to enable the public for 
decision-making on risk reducing behaviours. It is therefore essential to work with the 
media at all levels - the local, national and international, as they are quick, have a broad 
geographic coverage, are influential and often cost effective. The WHO approach to 
communications during outbreak situations is characterised by five principles: trust, 
early announcement, transparency, listening (surveillance) and planning. “Showing the 
work - shaping the narrative” and the use of new information technology is the 
paradigm of WHO that aims at rendering communications more proactive and 
transparent. This requires coordination between technical areas, understandable 
messages, and community engagement embedded in a listening approach. In examples 
from Liberia in 2014 WHO demonstrated three phases of their communication 
approach which illustrates the inner-organisational learning: in the initial phase they 
applied a crisis communication strategy building on the rationale of past experiences of 
Ebola in outbreaks in remote settings with a 90% death rate. The key messages at this 
early stage were that “Ebola kills”, Ebola has no cure and that bush meat consumption 
spread the disease. These key messages were distributed via mass media, posters and 
radio and resulted in denial: the perception was that Ebola spread in remote areas and 
when people don’t eat bush meat they won’t contract the disease. It also led to sick 
people staying (and dying) at home as the message was that there is no cure and no 
treatment for Ebola. In a second phase the risk communication strategy moved to 
awareness-raising under the rationale that Ebola spread in major cities, but with 
increasing survival rates. The key messages in this second phase were that “Ebola is 
real”, there are signs and symptoms to watch that can be treated and a hotline to call for 
transport to treatment centres. The interventions broadened from mass media to include 
campaign mode using town criers and loud speakers on trucks and motorbikes. The 
outcomes of this awareness-raising strategy was that the demands from the public 
quickly exceeded response capacities and led to a lack of confidence and trust in 
existing structures. In a third phase the risk communication strategy applied community 
engagement with the rationale that communities are part of the solution. The key 
messages were to avoid unprotected contact with dead bodies, that early treatment 
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increases survival rates and to de-stigmatise survivors. The communication 
interventions were more interpersonal with community meetings and trainings. The 
outcomes of this approach were that community influencers are part of the response 
and need for more decentralised, localised communication. The three stages of risk 
communication approaches during the response to Ebola were incorporated in a 
lessons-learned process in WHO that resulted in giving more importance to community 
engagement and listening approaches in risk communication.  
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 
presented the steep learning curve that the organisation made during its response to the 
outbreak. IFRC interventions in the affected region had a focus on community 
communication and engagement as the people on the ground are the drivers of the 
disease: they can spread or stop the outbreak. Respecting local cultures, understanding 
their information needs, building trust and taking time to build relationship by 
introducing its staff as reliable partners in a joint process of change was at the core of 
the IFRC approach. In addition, using new technology to improve the two-way 
communication between authorities and communities and generating data on 
perception, beliefs as well as rumours were key activities to inform and shape the 
community engagement strategy. There was a shift in the organisation in regards to the 
perception of rumours: rather than fighting misinformation, rumours were seen as 
important sources where more collaboration was needed. Rumours about organ trading, 
cannibalism and mutilation of dead bodies in Ebola centres were circulating in the 
communities; Ebola was understood as a death sentence which led to avoiding the 
health centres, hiding the sick and burying the dead relatives in traditional burial rituals 
– which triggered more infections. Understanding rumours required a rumour gathering 
system. The scarcity of information in the organisation of what communities fear, know 
and wish to know was a major challenge; thus, IFRC initiated a real time emergency 
knowledge/information management system of socio-anthropological data and rumour 
management through rapid phone-based surveys building on the network of volunteers. 
From a governance perspective, IFRC changed their communication approach to be 
more inclusive and gathered regular feedback from the people and communities they 
worked with; this led to better relationships and, as a result, improved access to and a 
better understanding of the communities.  
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Social science perspective 
The social science perspective reflected on the common concepts of community 
engagement, participative communication and the biomedical narrative in outbreak 
response and advocated for a paradigm shift. Communities are smart, as their 
behavioural patterns and norms are survival mechanisms which make sense in their 
contexts. Discrediting behaviour as irrational does not value the practical intelligence 
communities have. Rumours, for example, should not merely be understood as signs of 
misconception and misunderstanding, but considered as important indicators that could 
guide outbreak detection. Fighting and “confronting” rumours with the “truth” does not 
work, because representatives of an official biomedical rationale and communities have 
different concepts of risks. While international health workers stressed, for example, 
the importance of hygiene and recommended to wash hands regularly and avoid contact 
with sick or dead people, these hygiene risks were not what the communities perceived 
as risks. From their perspective the major risk was to be buried in a non-traditional way. 
In order to mitigate the risk of a non-traditional burial, communities resisted the advice 
and even reacted at times with violence as their worries and information demands were 
not met. For this reason, dialogues with communities can be unsuccessful as 
international health professionals represent a biomedical narrative and consider Ebola 
as an epidemiological problem, whereas communities see Ebola as a social problem 
and may have different priorities. The community engagement approach of 
international stakeholders was also critically reflected. Engaging communities is often 
practised by working with key community people. However, this engagement approach 
is prone to replicating the official local distribution of power and authority (e.g. 
community chiefs) and neglect those community members who can play relevant roles 
but are less established in the international community engagement approach such as 
faith healers, midwives and “queen mums”. To this end, risk communication should 
include broader leadership roles of communities and be rather empowering than 
engaging.  
 
Institutional reflections on outbreak management 
The German Robert Koch Institute (RKI) continued the critical reflection on the two 
aspects of the Ebola outbreaks: Ebola as epidemiological event and as a social event. 
From an epidemiological point of view, the RKI did the required preparedness for 
outbreak response and assessed the risk of Ebola in Germany as low. However, the 
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public and media interest showed a dynamic that was not in relation to the 
epidemiological public health risk. While the RKI was well prepared for Ebola in terms 
of an infectious disease, the dynamic of public awareness was somewhat surprising. 
Having two outbreaks dynamics – the epidemiological and the social dynamic – is not 
unique to Ebola, but is a common phenomenon. The outbreak of Shiga toxin-producing 
E. coli (STEC) that can cause Haemolytic Uraemic Syndrome (HUS) in Germany in 
2011 provided key insights into national risk and outbreak communications. This large 
outbreak showed a different clinic pattern and even caused 54 deaths and almost 845 
cases of HUS.17 A key challenge was to determine the source of the food contamination 
and communication of this uncertainty was particularly difficult and of high impact. 
The public health authority found itself managing two challenges: the epidemiological 
outbreak and the social dynamic of a strong public interest. The public health interest 
and media attention seemed to have followed different, non-medical triggers and it was 
thus difficult for scientists in charge of managing the outbreak investigations to 
integrate this dynamic into an overall management. Furthermore, certain actors from 
food industry suffered economic repercussions after the announcement of false 
information that a vegetable of a particular country was the source of this 
contamination. The STEC experience showed that a better understanding of the 
dynamic of public interest would improve the epidemiological preparedness planning. 
Risk communication strategies should therefore include the social perspective into their 
assessments and offer a more holistic view of the outbreak dynamics. These broader 
assessments require the collaboration of different disciplines and technical areas – and 
a governance approach that reinforces and encourages multidisciplinary and 
multisectoral collaboration in regards to more comprehensive information gathering, 
assessing and sharing. !
 
Point of entry: international airports 
International airports are interfaces linking the private sector of nationally and 
internationally regulated aviation industry to public health, which is also regulated both 
at national and international level. To this end, airports are epitomes of multisectoral 
collaboration with the operational rationale of minimising negative impacts both on 
economies and health while maintaining business continuity. Information management 
and communication play a key role and are organised in Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) in compliance with national and international regulations. As a private sector 
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entity the airport is well aware of the influence of the media and aims to maintain a 
good relationship with journalists and other public and political groups. The key factor 
to success is to maintain relationships that are, at a technical level, formalised in SOPs 
and, at governance level, in personal connections.  
Recommendations for the development of risk communication strategies include to 
start risk communication early, work with multiple stakeholders, initiate and foster 
collaboration by routine information sharing and communication. Creating the 
governance that supports this approach is a core management task in teams and 
organisations dealing with risk communication.   
 
Discussion  
The discussions at the conference evolved around four key areas of improvement for 
risk communication:  
! Understanding communication as a multidimensional process in risk 
communication and enhancing listening approaches and regular feedback 
mechanisms to allow communities to guide and inform timely changes in risk 
communication strategies 
While this understanding of communication is quite established in theory, practice and, 
more importantly, organisational governance approaches were slow in adopting this 
broader, interactive approach to an extent that was more than a lip service. The Ebola 
outbreak provided a steep learning curve for organisations with the outcome that risk 
communication is now incorporating community engagement and active listening in 
their organisation strategies at WHO, IFRC, UNICEF and others.  
! Broadening the biomedical paradigm and integrate social science intelligence into 
epidemiological risk assessments 
Different thought cultures, scientific methods and departments in organisations require 
a strong, respectful and unifying governance approach to enable this collaboration. 
More importantly, community or lay risk assessment can challenge biomedical 
orthodoxies; this requires the new role of risk communication as a mediating position, 
offering explanations to all parties (scientists, lay people, etc.) of the different concepts 
of risks and moderating and promoting an approach that acknowledges the differences.   
! Strengthening multisectoral collaboration and working with local organisations  
The collaboration between and among professionals from different sectors and with 
local organisations is key to prevent and prepare, detect early and respond swiftly to 
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public health events, but the collaboration can be challenging. This relationship 
building require times, patience, competence, confidence and trust. All attributes cannot 
be created during times of urgencies, but need ahead planning and a risk communication 
governance approach that promotes and reinforces this relationship building as routine 
practice.  
! Spearheading changes in own organisations for better risk communication 
governance and build capacities and behaviour change in own staff and health 
professionals  
Risk communication is not merely a technical capacity, but a governance approach that 
enables broader practice and improvements of technical areas. In order to accommodate 
this new paradigm of risk communication, organisations need to identify and promote 
changes to enable this risk governance approach. Risk communication is primarily 
about changing own, organisational behaviour. These changes will then impact the 
behaviour of others. To integrate this risk communication approach into the governance 
of organisations and national strategies is the challenge that countries and organisations 
will have to undertake.    
 
Recommendations 
While these improvement areas provide important information, the key element in the 
discussion was how these improvements can be reflected in risk communication 
strategies at national levels: what do health authorities need to consider in the 
development of risk communication strategies? Key recommendations for the 
development of risk communication strategies were given in four areas: Governance as 
well as the three strategic axes of information, communication and coordination:  
Governance & Organisation  
1. Build networks with stakeholders within the health sector and from other sectors, 
media, civil society and start sharing information and communicate regularly. 
2. Aim for a shared community engagement approach that can be activated in case of 
outbreaks. 
3. Start installing a cultural change within the organisation by building the 
competence, capacity and skills in health authorities and professionals to 
understand and practice risk communication.  
Information  
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4. Integrate social science (sociology, anthropology, psychology, etc.) and other 
sources into risk assessment to broaden the biomedical narrative.  
5. Listen to communities to gather intelligence and regular feedback on risk 
communication approaches and biomedical services. 
Communication  
6. Communication is not just the conveyance of information. Build relationship and 
engage with communities and media. 
7. Media should be seen as a partner supporting risk communication to bridge the gap 
between the perception of the public and the scientific assessment of risks 
8. Have a proactive, transparent and participatory communication approach. 
Coordination  
9. Have clear and transparent coordination and collaboration mechanisms that enable 
learning. 
10. Integrate risk communication into public health disciplines to improve risk 
assessment, planning and preparedness for public health risks.  
11. Have a national risk communication strategy and operational plan including all 
stakeholders, for instance local organizations working at community level; share 
nationally and internationally and exercise this approach.  
 
Conclusion 
The conference provided a platform for exchanges of experiences and expertise and the 
discussion highlighted the major themes of risk communication: Risk communicaiton 
should be proactive, participatory, multisectoral, facilitating the connection between 
sectors and strengthening collaboration. National strategies on risk communication 
should conceptualise risk communication on a governance and organisational level and 
along its three strategic axes of information, communication and coordination. Relevant 
areas for improvement were identified, such as to understand communication as a 
multidimensional process in the risk communication, broaden the biomedical paradigm 
and integrate social science intelligence into epidemiological risk assessments, 
strengthen multisectoral collaboration to ensure relevant advice, and spearhead changes 
in own organisations for better risk communication governance and develop capacities 
and behavioural change in own staff and health professionals. 
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The results of this conference inform the development of national risk communication 
strategies in Morocco and Tunisia.  
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IV. Assessment score for public health security 
1. THE MARBURG BIOSAFETY AND BIOSECURITY SCALE (MBBS): A 
framework for risk assessment and risk communication22 
 
Abstract 
Current risk assessment and risk communication of biosafety and biosecurity lacks a 
convenient metric and conceptual framework. The absence of such a systematic tool, 
the authors argue, makes communication more difficult and can lead to ambiguous 
public perception of and response to biosafety incidents and biosecurity threats. A new 
seven category scoring scale for the handling of human and animal pathogens is 
proposed that could help clarify risk categories, facilitate coordination and 
communication and improve public understanding of risk related to biosafety and 
biosecurity. 
 
Keywords: Biosafety, Biosecurity, BSL4, Biocontainment, Risk assessment, Risk 
communication 
 
Introduction 
International prevention and control of infectious diseases epidemics and pandemics 
such as Influenza and in particular outbreaks of emerging and re-emerging highly 
infectious pathogens such as SARS coronavirus, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome 
(MERS)-coronavirus and Ebola virus require a variety of health system capacities 
including laboratories that can diagnose and conduct research on such pathogenic 
agents.1, 2 All Member States of the World Health Organization (WHO) have 
recognised the importance of this capacity building in their adoption of the International 
Health Regulations (IHR 2005) which legally obliges all countries to build and maintain 
the capacity to prevent and respond to public health emergencies.2 There is a general 
agreement that scientific investigation of human and animal pathogens is necessary for 
preparedness of and response to outbreaks. Thus, the implementation of biosafety and 
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biosecurity measures is of high priority to ensure safe and secure handling of 
biomaterials. 
 
Concepts of biosafety and biosecurity 
Biosafety refers to principles, technologies, practices and measures implemented to 
prevent the accidental release of, or unintentional exposure to, infectious or toxic 
biological agents. Biosecurity refers to the protection, control and accountability 
measures implemented to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release 
of infectious or toxic biological agents and related resources as well as unauthorized 
access to, retention or transfer of such material.3  
 
Biocontainment 
To ensure the safety of laboratory personnel and the environment, work on pathogens 
in laboratory settings is currently classified in biosafety levels 1-4 (BSL1-4).4 The 
biosafety levels are designated in ascending order, by degree of protection needed for 
personnel, the environment, and the community.  
This classification draws on the concept of biocontainment that is the difference 
between a pathogenic interior and a less pathogenic exterior such as work/personnel or 
laboratory/environment and a stabile barrier between them. 5 The physical containment 
of infectious pathogens or toxins is required to prevent accidental infection of workers 
or release of pathogens into the environment during scientific research or diagnostics.  
 
Biosafety and biosecurity threats 
Laboratories of high and highest biosafety level, BSL3 and 4, handle human and animal 
pathogenic agents, against which no treatment or vaccines are available. Those 
laboratories are necessary to diagnose infectious pathogens, guide infection control 
measures and conduct research into new vaccines and treatment options. Very strict 
guidelines regulate BSL3 and 4 laboratory operations. The sheer existence of a high 
security laboratory is perceived as threatening as incidents could cause pathogens to 
physically escape the laboratory and contaminate the environment and accidents inside 
the laboratory could occur that lead to laboratory-acquired infections.6-9 In the 
aftermath of the anthrax letters, biosecurity fears have also increased. Concerns have 
been raised about BSL4 laboratories, in particular, as potential source of security threats 
because their materials and technologies could be used to threaten societies.  
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Dual use dilemma 
Research and development in the field of biomedical sciences pose a dual use dilemma. 
While scientific discoveries can be used in beneficial ways to cure diseases and improve 
health, they can also be used for malicious purposes, e.g. as biological weapons. Dual 
use as a conceptual term originates from the cold war where it was applied to concerns 
related to nuclear material and its weaponisation. Biomedical sciences in the post 
genomic era bring a new dimension to the dual use dilemma: their dual use potential is 
not only material-based (e.g. possession of pathogens), but, more importantly, 
information-based (possession of sequence information).10 The relevant dual aspects 
are not only physical possession of pathogens but also knowledge and information 
about how to modify or manipulate the original structure (e.g. sequences of amino 
acids, mutations, etc.). These dual use concerns have recently been broadly discussed 
when researchers successfully introduced mutations to an avian influenza virus that 
enhanced its transmissibility (gain-of-functions experiments).11,12 
 
Risk assessment and risk communication 
Biosafety, biosecurity and dual use concepts are complex, lack standardisation, and are 
often understood differently by scientific and security experts, policy-makers and the 
public. Current risk assessment and communication of biosafety and biosecurity add 
ambiguity as they lack explicit metrics. To address this challenge we have developed a 
new scale to help frame risk assessment and facilitate risk communication related to the 
classification of biosafety incidents and biosecurity levels. 
 
Concept: Marburg Biosafety and Biosecurity Scale (MBBS)  
Drawing on the concept of scaling nuclear events using the International Nuclear Event 
Scale (INES) an explicit metric was developed to assess biosafety incidents and 
biosecurity levels using a scale from 0 to 7.  
 
For biosafety, we evaluate the impact of laboratory-originated incidents on personnel, 
integrity of containment (in this context: biocontainment) and the environment. In order 
to avoid confusion with the BSL classification and to emphasise what we are 
measuring, we use a biosafety incident scale to classify what kind of incidents could 
occur in laboratories that handle human and animal pathogens and how severe they are 
in terms of impact on personnel, containment and environment. Biosafety incidents 0-
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3 describe incidents that could, however unlikely, happen within routine laboratory 
operations; incident levels 4-7 describe accidents or attacks from external acteurs. From 
incident level 4 on, biosafety and biosecurity scale merge.  
For biosecurity, we use levels to classify situations. Our starting point is the distinction 
between physical/material-base and intangible/information-based threats and we then 
further reflect issues related to the impacts on individuals, integrity of containment (in 
this context: control and effectiveness of response mechanisms) and the public. In 
contrast to the biosafety incident scale, the biosecurity levels 0-3 describe situations 
and not incidents. Only from biosecurity levels 4 and higher does the scale describe 
incidents. Botulinum toxin, for instance, is a biosecurity relevant pathogen that is 
currently in use for medical and cosmetic purposes. This is a biosecurity level 0. If 
botulinum toxin would be used to intentionally harm a person (biosecurity level 4) or 
in synchronised attacks in one country (biosecurity 6) or several countries (biosecurity 
level 7) the biosecurity level would increase. 
 
The first four scores (MBBS 0-3) of biosafety and biosecurity relevant incidents and 
situations develop (and would be reported) independently while from MBBS 4 on 
biosafety and biosecurity aspects move closer together, are less discrete and have a 
similar common final path (locally contained, regional, national and international 
impact). Literally, the biosafety and biosecurity scale forms a Y-shape where one arm 
of the Y is the biosafety branch and the other arm the biosecurity arm, both leading into 
a common final path.   
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Figure 1: Y-shape of biosafety and biosecurity scale 
 
Marburg Biosafety and Biosecurity Scale – Biosafety branch 
The biosafety branch refers to work on human and animal pathogens in high 
containment laboratories (BSL3-4) and provides a metric for evaluating incidents in 
regards to the impact they have on personnel, the integrity of the containment and the 
environment.  
Biosafety incident O classifies an incident of no or minor impact on personnel and 
integrity of containment and no impact on the environment. A hole in one of the three 
gloves e.g. due to a material defect without contamination would be an example. In the 
laboratory such events are described as technical incidents and are recorded in the 
record book of each laboratory but do not require any notification to regulatory 
authorities. Although this situation does not require notification to authorities, all 
personnel are informed about such technical incidents. Reporting of such incidents, 
however minor, is a very important for the safe operation of high containment 
laboratories. From a safety control system perspective, such reporting should never 
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have negative professional consequences and, in fact, reporting should be encouraged 
to improve the overall adoption of safer working practises. 
 
Incident level 1 classifies a situation where there is a minor impact on the integrity of 
biocontainment, no or minor impact on personnel and no impact on the environment. 
A torn protection suit without infectious risks would be an example. This kind of low 
impact incidents requires notification to the organisational authority of the laboratory 
and information for all staff is provided.  
Incident level 2 classifies a situation where there is an impact on personnel and 
integrity of the biocontainment, but no impact on the environment. A needle-stick 
injury with infectious risk would be one example. Notifications of laboratory and health 
authorities are required for activation of response protocols and appropriate treatment 
measures for the injured are activated. Information for all personnel is provided.  
Incident level 3 classifies a serious incident that affects personnel, the integrity of the 
biocontainment and the environment. This could be the case when infected staff has 
not been quarantined and transmission of disease to people inside and outside the 
laboratory cannot be excluded, but are not reported yet.  
The leakage of agricultural relevant pathogens e.g., foot-and-mouth-disease virus from 
the laboratory into the environment because of a damaged sewage system with limited 
infections would be another incident level 3 situation. Response measures include 
notification of laboratory and public health authorities, as well as national authorities 
to activate containment measures and contact tracing. Information for personnel, local 
communities and general public should be provided.  
Incident level 4 classifies situations that are the result of physical damage to the 
containment. A fire due to a defective electrical device that damages the integrity of the 
biocontainment and leads to a release of pathogens (if they are not inactivated by the 
heat of the fire) would be one example for this level of a local accident. Level 4 is 
defined by situations where the environment may be contaminated but personnel are 
not exposed, e.g. a fire happening during the night. In such circumstances the 
emergency response team would focus on measures protecting the local area. 
Organisational, health and security authorities would work according to their 
emergency protocols. Information for personnel, local community and the public 
should be provided.  
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Incident level 5 classifies situations in which an accident has wider consequences and 
personnel and the public was exposed. Exposed persons are in quarantine, contact 
tracing would be implemented. Similar emergency response measures would be taken 
like in level 4.  
Incident level 6 is an escalation of level 5 where disease cases in consequence of 
exposure are reported indicating a sustained chain of transmission. Infections, however, 
are limited to one country.  
Incident level 7 is the widest escalation with cases are detected in various countries. In 
this case national and international emergency response measures should be placed. 
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Marburg Biosafety and Biosecurity Scale (MBBS) – Biosafety branch 
Biosafety Descripti0n Impact on 
personnel 
 
Impact on 
integrity of 
containment 
Impact on the 
environment 
Examples Consequences 
0 Internal 
technical 
incident 
No 
notification 
required 
No or minor 
impact 
 
0 
No or minor impact 
 
0 
No 
 
0 
A hole in 
one of the 
three gloves 
Adaption of organisation;  
Information of all staff 
1 Low impact 
incident 
 
Notification 
required 
Minor impact 
 
 
 
0 
Minor impact 
 
 
 
I 
 
No 
 
 
 
0 
A torn 
protection 
suit without 
infectious 
risk 
 
Notification of laboratory authority and 
occupational health 
Information of all staff 
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2 Incident 
 
 
Notification 
required 
Suspected case 
(Limited loss of 
layered security 
measures) 
 
I 
Minor impact  
 
 
 
 
I 
No 
 
 
 
 
0 
Needle stick 
injury with 
infectious 
risk 
 
Notification of laboratory, occupational 
and health authorities 
Quarantine 
Information of all staff 
3 Serious 
incident 
 
Notification 
required 
Contamination 
and/or health 
threats 
Loss of layered 
security measures  
 
I 
Minor impact  
 
 
 
 
 
I 
Possible 
infection of 
contact persons 
 
 
 
I 
Contagious 
staff without  
Quarantine 
(Probable 
case)  
Leakage of 
sewage 
water or 
unsafe waste 
(e.g. 
Pirbright) 
Contact tracing 
 
Containment efforts 
 
Notification protocol 
Information of staff and public 
! 112 
4 Accident with 
local 
consequences 
Staff not exposed 
(e.g. during the 
night) 
Damage to 
laboratory and 
integrity of 
containment 
Release of 
pathogens to 
environment 
 
Potential 
exposure of the 
public  
Sudden 
excess 
pressure 
(explosion) 
Release of 
pathogens 
Police and fire fighters close off the 
local environment 
Emergency protocol 
Information of staff and public 
5 Accident with 
wider 
consequences 
Contamination of 
staff 
Damage to 
laboratory and 
integrity of 
containment 
Release of 
pathogens to 
environment 
Potential 
exposure of the 
public  
Sudden 
excess 
pressure 
(explosion) 
 
Release of 
pathogens  
Police and fire fighters close off the 
local environment 
Emergency protocol 
Information of staff and public 
6 Serious 
Accident  
Contamination of 
staff 
Serious damage to 
laboratory and 
integrity of 
containment 
Release of 
pathogens to 
environment 
 
Sudden 
excess 
pressure 
(explosion) 
National emergency response protocol 
Information of staff and public 
! 113 
Cases in the 
public (one 
country) 
Release of 
pathogens 
7 Major 
Accident 
Contamination of 
staff 
Severe damage to 
laboratory and 
integrity of 
containment 
 
Release of 
pathogens to 
environment 
 
Cases in 
several 
countries 
Sudden 
excess 
pressure 
(explosion) 
 
Release of 
pathogens 
International emergency response 
protocol 
Information of staff and public 
Table 1: Marburg Biosafety and Biosecurity Scale (MBBS) – Biosafety branch
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Marburg Biosafety and Biosecurity Scale (MBBS) – Biosecurity branch 
The biosecurity branch of the Marburg Biosafety and Biosecurity Scale (MMBS) 
includes level 0 to 7 where the first four biosecurity levels MBBS 0-3 describe 
situations of laboratory development or manipulations whereas biosecurity levels 
MBBS 4 – 7 classifies incidents with wider implications. The biosecurity scale, 
however, does not include the wide-ranging long-term social and political amplification 
and ripple effects biosecurity incidents could have on society.  
Biosecurity in this understanding refers to any activity, material, knowledge and 
information that could be used for malicious purposes to pose threats, commit crime or 
terror attacks.  
As an initial distinction we discriminate between tangible, physical dimensions or 
intangible, information-based dimensions of biological threats. We evaluate biological 
threats against its impact on individuals, on the integrity of containment (this includes 
the ability to respond to infectious diseases and contain the pathogen) and on the public.  
Biosecurity level 0 classifies the situation of the tangible, factual material existence of 
pathogens or toxins in the local community and/or environment, e.g. ricin growing on 
bushes, anthrax can be found in the soil, c. botulinum in medical and cosmetic use and 
avian influenza occurring naturally.  
Biosecurity level 1 classifies the situation of intangible dual use where information can 
be used to modify pathogens based on direct, information-based application of common 
laboratory practice. As a result, pathogens can become more dangerous to humans. 
Examples are gain-of-function experiments that modify transmissibility or mortality in 
a laboratory setting.  
Biosecurity level 2 describes an escalation of level 1 in which information-based, 
scientific achievements are used in an interdisciplinary approach to modify 
characteristics. One example would be the anthrax letters: the anthrax spores were 
coated in a particular manner to avoid clumping which presents a common problem in 
the dispersion of fine powder; this technique is used in a different science (engineering, 
physics) and the lateral application poses a different and new threat level.  
Biosecurity level 3 classifies the situation of a material-based theft of pathogenic 
agents with minor impact on individuals and the integrity of the containment and 
potential impact on the public. In contrast to biosafety level 3 where pathogenic agents 
could be released incidentally, this biosecurity level 3 has a criminal or terrorist 
purpose.  
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Biosecurity level 4 classifies an attack with local consequences, such as an attack on 
an individual with a pathogenic agent. Impact on individuals would be minor to major, 
minor impact on the public and treatment and/or prophylaxis are available.  
Biosecurity level 5 classifies the situation of intentional release of a pathogen to a 
group of public with major impact on individuals and the public while prophylaxis 
and/or treatment is available. Difference to level 4 is the occurrence of several cases in 
the countries, probably as a synchronised attack.  
Biosecurity level 6 classifies the situation of intentional release of a pathogen to a 
group of public where treatment and/or prophylaxis is unavailable and several cases 
occur nationally. Difference to level 5 is that the epidemiological containment measures 
are limited (no prophylaxis or causal treatment). 
Biosecurity level 7 classifies the situation of an intentional release of a pathogen where 
cases occur in different countries and prophylaxis and/or treatment is not available. 
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Marburg Biosafety and Biosecurity Scale (MBBS) – Biosecurity branch 
Biosecurity Tangible/Phy
sical 
Intangible/Information Impact on 
individuals 
Impact on integrity 
of containment 
Impact on 
the public 
Examples Possible Response 
strategies 
Consequences 
0 Dual use 
dilemma 
 
Material base 
 No or minor 
impact 
 
0 
 
No or minor impact 
 
0 
No 
 
0 
Pathogens Education and 
training 
Risk 
communication  
Policy 
Awareness 
1  
 
Dual use dilemma 
 
Information base 
Direct  
No or minor 
impact 
 
0 
Minor impact 
 
 
I 
No 
 
 
0 
Gain-of-
function 
research and 
publication 
Education and 
training 
Risk 
communication  
Policy 
Awareness  
2  Dual use dilemma 
Information base 
Indirect 
No or minor 
impact 
 
Minor impact  
 
 
No 
 
 
Lateral 
application of 
gain-of-
function 
Education and 
training 
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I 
 
I 0 research and 
publication 
Risk 
communication  
Policy 
Awareness 
3 Serious 
incident 
 
Notification 
required 
 Minor impact  
 
 
I 
Minor impact 
 
 
I 
Potential 
impact 
 
I 
Theft of 
pathogenic 
material from 
a BSL3 or 4 
lab 
 
Security and 
intelligence 
investigations 
Risk 
communication 
4 
 
Attack with 
local 
consequences  
 Minor to major 
impact 
 
  
Prophylaxis and/or 
treatment available  
Minor Intentional 
release of 
pathogens to 
attack 
individuals 
(e.g. Markov 
Ricin attack) 
Security and 
intelligence 
investigations 
 
Risk and crisis 
communication 
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Table 2: Marburg Biosafety and Biosecurity Scale (MBBS) – Biosecurity branch 
 
5 Attack with 
wider 
consequences 
 Major Prophylaxis and/or 
treatment available 
Major  Intentional 
release of 
pathogens  
 
Several cases 
in one 
country 
Security and 
intelligence 
investigations 
Emergency 
protocol 
Information of 
staff and public 
6 Serious Attack   Major Prophylaxis and/or 
treatment 
unavailable 
Major 
 
 
Intentional 
release of 
pathogens 
Several cases 
in one 
country 
National 
emergency 
response protocol 
Information of 
staff and public 
7 Major Attack  Major Prophylaxis and/or 
treatment 
unavailable 
Major 
 
 
Intentional 
release of 
pathogens 
Cases in 
several 
countries 
International 
emergency 
response protocol 
Information of 
staff and public 
Discussion 
This proposed scale provides a unique framework for a rational and transparent classification 
of biosafety and biosecurity concern both prospectively and retrospectively to contribute to the 
assessment and communication of biological risks. Until now, there has been no rating or 
scaling of biological risks. However, in the field of biosafety, emergency protocols are in place 
and are exercised in different settings such as in lab exercises or national exercises that form 
part of routine quality control procedures. Biosecurity is more vague and there are no or less 
established routines to respond to these threats and test and evaluate the effectiveness of 
response measures.  
 
Scope 
The biosafety incident scale can contribute to a clearer understanding of the nature of incidents 
in the laboratory (incident level 0-3) and accidents or attacks on laboratories (incident level 4-
7) while the biosecurity level provides an overview of situations (biosecurity level 0-3) and 
incidents (biosecurity level 4-7). Both scales merge from incident/level 4 on where ‘accidents’ 
at/to laboratories are the results of intentional malicious purposes, such as an explosion in/at a 
BSL4 laboratory.  
Assessment 
The MBBS scale could be used to better understand incidents and consequences and re-think 
strategic response measures. Having an explicit framework in place that illustrates where in the 
scale the situation actually is, how it could develop and what might be necessary, is important 
strategic information that can inform response strategies well ahead of escalating situations. 
Response mechanisms to biosecurity threats are not unified and in place. For this purpose, we 
included a column on possible response strategies and consequences. This could be used by 
relevant institutions and groups to reflect and structure their response.  
 
Re-assessment 
Working through scenarios the scale, for example, could show that the former, often intuitive 
risk assessment assuming that BSL4 labs are more dangerous than BSL3 laboratories could be 
misleading. BSL4 work is highly regulated and certain threats such as explosions cannot 
happen – as all explosive materials are prohibited inside BSL4 facilities per se. BSL3 labs are 
less regulated and wider distributed; having higher levels on the biosafety scale might lead to 
a re-think among regulators and policy makers.  
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Quality control  
The notification and reporting that are required on the different levels could also be used to 
evaluate quality in laboratories.  
 
Improved communication 
A major aspect of this scale is to allow a clearer and more consistent communication. Having 
the same explicit rationale in place facilitate coordination with institutions and communication 
with colleagues and the public.   
 
Bioseverity scale 
In order to better understand the health implication of biosafety and biosecurity 4-7 and the 
severity of the epidemiological situation a third assessment and communication rationale 
would be necessary to classify clinical outbreak scenarios and guide public health response. 
This “bioseverity scale” is currently being developed to assess the clinical and epidemiological 
situation for public health responses.  
 
Limitations 
The proposed MBBS scale is a conceptual evaluation framework and metric and its 
applicability and benefit need to be demonstrated in further discussions and use. However, the 
Marburg Biosafety and Biosecurity scale does not include a way of measuring the social and 
political factors that shape and have implications for both the identification and responses to 
incidents, accidents and attacks. In its current form it is limited to developing a standardized 
measuring and communicating tool that could improve understanding and clarity of risk 
assessment and communication related to laboratory safety and security.  
 
Intelligence 
The key question for security intelligence is how easily or likely a biosecurity level 0-3 could 
develop into biosecurity 4-7, or how likely a biosafety incident 4-7 is. However, the purpose 
of this scale at this stage is to provide an explicit rationale for assessment and communication; 
it does not provide an intelligence tool to assess how likely or feasible situations may develop.  
 
Conclusion 
Drawing on similar scales to rate and evaluate natural threats and nuclear events, this biosafety 
and biosecurity scale provides an explicit metric to rate biosafety and biosecurity to improve 
!
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risk assessment and risk communication. It could also serve to improve quality assessment of 
laboratory work, inform policy and political decision-makers and help conceptualize 
appropriate response measures. 
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2. LOCAL – PEOPLE – MAKE SENSE: BIOSAFETY AND BIOSECURITY: A relative 
risk-based framework for safer, more secure and sustainable laboratory 
capacity building23  
 
Abstract 
Background: Laboratory capacity building is characterized by a paradox between endemicity 
and resources: Countries with high endemicity of pathogenic agents often have low and 
intermittent resources (water, electricity) and capacities (laboratories, trained staff, adequate 
regulations). Meanwhile, countries with low endemicity of pathogenic agents often have high 
containment facilities with costly infrastructure and maintenance governed by regulations. The 
common practice of exporting high biocontainment facilities and standards is not sustainable 
and concerns about biosafety and biosecurity require careful consideration.  
Methods: A group at Chatham House developed a draft conceptual framework for safer, more 
secure and sustainable laboratory capacity building.  
Results: The draft generic framework is guided by the phrase ‘LOCAL – PEOPLE – MAKE 
SENSE’ that represents three major principles: capacity building according to local needs 
(local) with an emphasis on relationship and trust-building (people) and continuous outcome 
and impact measurement (make sense).  
Conclusions: This draft generic framework can serve as a blueprint for international policy 
decision-making on improving biosafety and biosecurity in laboratory capacity building, but 
requires more testing and detailing development. 
 
Keywords: Biosafety, Biosecurity, Laboratory capacity building, Biorisk, International Health 
Regulations, Emerging infectious diseases 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
International prevention and control of infectious diseases requires a variety of health (human 
and animal) system capacities including laboratory capacity for surveillance and diagnostics 
worldwide.[1-3] This capacity building is recognised and enforced by the revised International 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Petra Dickmann, Heather Sheeley and Nigel Lightfoot (2015) Biosafety and biosecurity: a relative risk-based 
framework for safer, more secure, and sustainable laboratory capacity building. Front. Public Health 3:241. doi: 
10.3389/fpubh.2015.00241 
REPRINT WITH GENEROUS PERMISSION OF FRONTIERS IN PUBLIC HEALTH. 
!
!
123 
Health Regulations (IHR 2005) of the World Health Organization (WHO).[4-6] Building 
laboratory capacity worldwide is, however, an activity with intrinsic complexities and 
paradoxes: countries with high endemicity of disease often have low resources (water, 
electricity) and capacities (laboratories, trained staff, adequate regulations) to survey and 
diagnose the diseases caused by these agents; whereas countries with low endemicity of high 
pathogenic agents often have high containment facilities with costly infrastructure and 
maintenance.  
 
With increasing laboratory capacity worldwide the global health security agenda considers 
biosafety and biosecurity topics as relevant.[7-9] In the international convention, Biosafety 
refers to “principles, technologies, practices and measures implemented to prevent the 
accidental release of, or unintentional exposure to pathogenic agents.”10 Biosecurity refers to 
the “protection, control and accountability measures implemented to prevent the loss, theft, 
misuse, diversion or intentional release of pathogenic agents and related resources as well as 
unauthorized access to, retention or transfer of such material.”[10] It is necessary to get the 
balance of concerns over proliferation and the need to diagnosis and undertake surveillance.  
 
Biomaterials have to be handled safely and securely in all settings: work on harmful and 
infectious biological materials inside laboratories needs to be contained and separated from a 
not-contaminated environment (biocontainment). To ensure the safety of laboratory personnel 
and the environment, work on pathogens in high-resource laboratory settings is classified in 
biosafety levels 1-4 (BSL1-4).[11] This classification draws on the concept of step-wise 
biocontainment that aims at keeping the pathogen confined to a designated space. 
Biocontainment, however, allows for a relative risk based, differential approach by focussing 
on the difference – the barrier – between a pathogenic interior and a less pathogenic exterior. 
The physical containment of pathogens protects the workers or the unintended release of 
pathogens that could lead to laboratories being the source of outbreaks. In high-resource 
settings regulations for safe operations in animal and human health laboratories exist.[12-16]  
However, despite its containment standards laboratory accidents[17], unintentional 
exposure[18-20] and unintentional release[21,22] occur and maintenance of these containment 
standard are strongly recommended.[23, 24]  
Additionally, security concerns exist about the proliferation of high-containment laboratories 
and the illegal acquisition or intentional release of high consequence pathogenic agents. 
Systems designed to prevent the misuse of potentially hazardous biological material are 
!
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generally described as biosecurity systems. Despite its importance, biosecurity concepts and 
approaches, however, are less well understood, not always adequately reflected, connected and 
implemented with biosafety systems.[25, 26]  Recently, a framework to help evaluate biosafety 
and biosecurity incidents provide a useful rationale.[27] This framework uses a seven category 
scale to assess incidents and situation ins regards to their impacts on personnel, integrity of 
containment and the environment. [27] Using this metric and rating system for risk assessment 
could improve the common understanding of biosafety and biosecurity risks and facilitate risk 
communication. 
 
To ensure the safe and secure handling of pathogenic agents the current practice is mainly 
focussed on exporting the complex costly containment, ‘western standard’ of laboratory safety 
into vulnerable areas of the world with high demand for laboratory activity due to emergency 
outbreak situations or a continuous high prevalence. This practice has not always been effective 
to date, needed investments have not been fully sustainable, the ‘western standard’ of biosafety 
relies on adequate and continuous access to resources and educated personnel.[28-30] 
Biosecurity concepts and approaches have been very slow to be addressed this at the same rate 
as the development of biosafety systems.[31]  
The Global Health Security Agenda points to a lack of collaboration and integration of health 
and security approaches and communities and thus calls to end the silo-thinking and 
encourages an integrated health security approach.[5, 32-34]  
 
There is a need for new and innovative approaches to building laboratory capacity worldwide, 
and in particular in low-resource settings, and ensure safe and secure handling of biomaterials.  
 
Safe and Secure Biomaterial Project 
To this end, a Chatham House project on “Safe and Secure Biomaterials”, funded by the UK 
International Biosecurity Programme, aimed to explore and analyse the practice and 
regulations of biosafety and biosecurity in low- and high-resource settings and develop a 
generic framework that could guide international policy decision-making to build laboratory 
capacity with a focus on low-resource settings.  
This project had two phases. In phase 1 (2012) of this research project, stakeholders were 
convened to discuss the research problem, the project plan of international laboratory capacity 
building and to provide an overview of the landscape of biosafety and biosecurity regulations 
and guidelines. In a Chatham House research paper the outcomes of the first phase describes 
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the need for laboratory capacity building, the discrepancy between endemicity and resources, 
different standards of biosafety and biosecurity regulations in G7 and seven low- and middle- 
income countries and the isolated approaches of the health and security communities.[35,36]  
The research paper suggests a relative risk approach to rethink current regulations and practices 
for further exploration in the next phase of the project.[37, 38]  
Phase 2 of the project (2014) used the conceptual framing of the relative risk approach to 
discuss and develop a generic framework for a safer, more secure and sustainable laboratory 
capacity building. In a scoping meeting with international stakeholders the approach and initial 
framework ideas were discussed and tested to prepare for a broader workshop. This scoping 
meeting was attended by 17 senior experts from low, middle- and high-income countries, 
international organisations and research institutions.  
  The bigger workshop offered a forum for intense collaboration and interaction of different 
stakeholders from low- and high-resource settings; the bigger workshop was attended by 23 
senior experts from biomedical sciences, engineering and policy-making from both fields of 
biosafety and biosecurity in low-, middle- and high-income countries. In this bottom-up 
approach the main pillars of the generic framework were created. This workshop also serves 
to agree on recommendations and promote this framework for adoption into the international 
discourse of biosafety and biosecurity.  
This article describes the generic framework, discusses the potential implication of this 
approach and summarises the recommendations for a safer, more secure and sustainable 
laboratory capacity building.  
 
Methods 
Key and diverse stakeholders from differing disciplines and backgrounds reflected and 
determined a generic framework for assessing best solutions for laboratory capacity building 
(smaller scoping meeting; larger workshop). This was done in a two-step process: in a smaller 
scoping meeting stakeholders were consulted to generate feedback on initial ideas to challenge 
conventional thinking and receive consensus regarding the relative-risk approach that would 
serve as a narrative to develop a generic framework in a broader workshop scenario.  
In a second step, the workshop applied a creative, interactive approach to jointly reflect and 
elaborate on safer, more secure and sustainable solutions for laboratory capacity building. The 
two-day workshop was based on interactive, interdisciplinary work in small groups of people 
coming from different professional backgrounds (biomedical, sciences, engineering and 
policy-making) with experience from both fields of biosafety and biosecurity in low-, middle- 
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and high-resource settings24. The workshop applied a focus group approach and emphasized 
group work that was structured to trigger dialogue and debate on current practices, stimulate 
thinking about what changes could lead to safer, more secure and sustainable laboratory 
capacity-building (particularly in low-income countries), and capture participant insights on 
the specific components, attributes and principles of such changes. People from a diverse 
background and experience used analytical tools and templates to analyse the contradictions, 
contrasts and issues and presented their results in plenary sessions for broader discussion.  
 
Results 
Relative-risk approach 
The relative-risk approach to safe and secure laboratory capacity building moves away from 
the use of predetermined standards under which work on particular pathogens should be 
performed. Such standards were felt to represent a Western and high-resource setting 
perspective that is far from realities in different parts of the world and neither achievable nor 
sustainable in low-resource settings. The relative-risk approach focuses on conditions of 
biosafety and biosecurity that can make work safer, more secure and sustainable in specific 
environments. To this end, the approach builds on a contextual assessment of risks and 
considers the system and environments (e.g., information, communication and coordination 
systems) in which laboratory capacity is being built. This differential approach reflects and 
relates ‘inside’ of the laboratory with ‘outside’ the laboratory and considers the permeability 
of the barrier separating them. This approach focuses on the barrier that separates the inside 
from the outside and provides a structured assessment of the relative risks. Rather than defining 
the endpoint as adherence to Western standards, it focuses on agreed outcomes (e.g. 
maintaining the biocontainment barrier) and develops contextually appropriate, relevant 
parameters for biosafety and biosecurity.  
 
Tools and templates used during the workshop incorporated this structure to help participants 
elicits the contextual parameters. The matrix templates were designed to reflect three 
dimensions:  
! Inside: people 
! Barrier: integrity of containment systems 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Participants from low, mid- and high income countries were chosen based on their experience in biosafety and 
biosecurity. The workshop was held under the Chatham House Rule; thus we are not permitted to disclose names.  
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! Outside: environment, e.g. structures and services 
 
For each dimension (i.e. people, integrity of containment, structures and services), groups 
identified key influencing factors and described how these could support innovative and 
sustainable solutions for a safer and more secure handling of biomaterials. To enable this 
discussion, the matrix required participants to reflect on an ideal situation and compare this to 
realities in high-resource and low-resource settings. 
 
Biosafety – biosecurity  
Biosafety and biosecurity requirements and concerns are often addressed separately and from 
different stakeholders’ perspectives. However, in this workshop participants articulated a shift 
in the conventional understanding of biosafety and biosecurity: rather than assuming biosafety 
and biosecurity as different and discrete entities, participants stressed that biosafety and 
biosecurity aspects are often intertwined and interlinking. Participants agreed that the many 
aspects and activities of biosafety and biosecurity could be and should be woven together as a 
tapestry with multiple layers and components, and concluded that the two areas of concern 
overlap. For instance, safe operations in laboratories require trust between staff members, 
training and reliable systems. The same aspects are relevant for biosecurity. Instead of stressing 
the differences, participants reinforced the approach to integrate biosafety and biosecurity in 
one interdisciplinary discourse.  
 
 
Objectives of a generic framework: SAFER 
The main objectives for a generic framework for safer, more secure and sustainable laboratory 
capacity building was captured by the SAFER acronym. SAFER stands for  
! Sustainable: laboratory capacity can be maintained independently over a long term period;  
! Affordable: communities do not depend on external aid for core functionality; 
! Functional: the laboratory staff are safer than currently, communities are at less risk of the 
laboratory being the source of the infection and the presence of the surveillance and 
diagnostic capability keeps the community safer; 
! Effective: laboratory capacity building presents the most suitable application for the 
specific environment; and  
! Realistic: laboratory capacity building is an answer to a question that the community 
actually has. 
!
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Generic framework: Local – People – Make sense 
The generic framework for sustainable, safer and more secure laboratory capacity has three 
principles that are summarised in the phrase ‘LOCAL – PEOPLE – MAKE SENSE.  
The first key principle is the LOCAL principle. This includes 
! Involving local people at every stage of capacity building; 
! Building on existing infrastructure (assets and needs, on-going developmental plans and 
activities); and  
! Meeting local requirements. 
! Sustained locally 
 
The second principle in laboratory capacity building is the PEOPLE principle. It is important 
to:  
! Build relationships;  
! Develop trust; 
! Develop relevant skills (e.g. laboratory, construction, testing, etc.) 
! Engage in two-way communication: gather intelligence insights on perceptions, culture, 
attitudes and behaviours that then inform communication and compliance; 
! Create networks; and  
! Advocate for political buy-in. 
 
The third principle reflects the need to monitor, measure and evaluate the process of improving 
biosafety and biosecurity in support of necessary laboratory procedures. Making sense is an 
active process that includes:  
! Developing metrics to use in measurement and evaluation; 
! Identifying relevance of settings and needs; 
! Measuring starting points and progress;  
! Evaluating effectiveness of the biosafety and biosecurity solution and networks of 
supporting structures of laboratory capability; and 
! Learning and informing developmental planning.  
 
Capacity building action areas: 4M 
The key biosafety and biosecurity capacity building areas are summarized in the mnemonic 
4M. These are:  
!
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! HUMAN: referring to training, education and communication activities;  
! METHODS: referring to developing standard operating procedures and guidelines;  
! MATERIAL: referring to designing appropriate buildings (engineering and architecture), 
and security; and 
! MONEY: referring to advocating for resource allocations and developing a range of 
funding models. 
 
Framework to guide decision-making 
The framework is a matrix that applies the three key principles (left column) as a y-axis to the 
four capacity building areas (4M) on an x-axis.  
 HUMANS  METHODS  MATERIAL  MONEY  
LOCAL     
PEOPLE     
MAKE SENSE     
Table 1: Local People Make Sense – key criteria for safer, more secure and sustainable capacity-
building 
 
The three key principles (Local - People - Make sense) should be applied to each of the capacity 
building areas. When considering capacity building e.g. in the field of ‘HUMANS’, training, 
education and communication activities have to match the ‘Local People Make sense’ criteria. 
Training has to include local people, building on existing infrastructures and meet local 
requirements. Training objectives need to include relationship building, trust development 
among relevant skill building, etc. Training efforts should be monitored and measured against 
the SAFER objectives; this requires the development of an appropriate metric in context-
sensitive and variable environment, etc.  
For capacity building in fields of methods, material and money, the same procedure is 
envisioned: capacity building activities in the fields of methods, material and money need to 
comply to the Local – People – Make Sense-principle. 
The fields of capacity building activities (Humans, Methods, Materials, Money), as a x-axis, 
and the Local – People – Make Sense-principle, as a y-axis, presents the guiding frame for the 
concept and design of activities, the empty fields in the matrix give room to develop solutions 
in different contexts that make sense in diverse and changing environments.  
!
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Discussion  
Generic application for local solutions 
This framework for sustainable, safer and more secure laboratory capacity is generic and aims 
to guide decision-making. It does not provide answers, but helps to develop local, context-
sensitive solutions. The application of this framework is seen as an iterative process. When 
facing decisions on if and how to improve laboratory capacity, the framework can help decision 
makers, scientists, architects and other stakeholders to agree on and achieve SAFER outcomes.  
 
Framework for planning, monitoring and evaluation 
This matrix serves as a core part of the conceptual framework that helps guide the i) planning, 
ii) monitoring and iii) evaluation of alternative approaches to laboratory capacity building 
worldwide. Although this framework is still in the drafting phase, participants felt that it 
indicates the right approach and provides planners, public and veterinary health scientists, 
policy-makers, engineers, architects and other professionals with a useful tool. 
 
Global initiatives with local solutions 
Training and capacity building are well established initiatives on the international agenda in 
development, science and science. However, in contrast to many capacity building activities, 
this framework calls for a different approach: rather than implementation ‘western’ goal and 
training programmes it calls for sustainable training that has to include local people from the 
beginning in the design period, building on existing infrastructures and meet local 
requirements. 
  
Limitations 
Lack of specific guidelines 
Among the limitations is, however, that this framework requires thinking. It is not applying 
ticks to pre-set check lists. Its generic nature can be criticised for being non-specific. However, 
this framework acknowledges that different disciplinary groups (engineers, architects, etc.) 
have created innovative technical solutions to discrete problems. This framework, however, 
has a more comprehensive and integrative understanding of biosafety and biosecurity; these 
concerns cannot be reduced and discussed on a level of isolated technical solutions. For 
instance, having naturally ventilated labs seem to be a good solution for an environment that 
has only intermittent access to power and constant climate conditions in laboratories, but a 
focus on individual technical solutions, such as natural ventilated labs, does not offer solutions 
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for broader and more complex biosafety and biosecurity. These complex concerns require a 
different angle.  
 
Hypothetical pilot status of the framework 
This framework is a theoretical, pilot framework and thus a draft. It was generated through a 
thorough analytic and reflective process involving key stakeholders. However, we believe that 
the application of the framework and the solutions generated with it in the future will add 
relevant feedback and probably amend- and/or refinements.  
 
Recommendations 
This draft framework will be further developed and contextualized. Envisioned are three major 
steps:  
 
1) Meetings to populate the framework 
! Technical meetings and implementation discussions with technical experts (engineers, 
architects, scientists, etc.) to populate the framework;  
 
2) Briefings to popularise the approach;  
! Briefings and discussion with key policy-makers; 
! Further support for countries to take this framework to political fora, international 
organisations and working groups such as World Health Assembly (WHA), the Global 
Health Security Agenda and the Global Partnership to gain universal acceptance and 
support for such an approach. 
 
3) In a next step, this further refined framework should promote political buy-in and advocate 
for changes in the laboratory capacity building policy and in funding schemes.  
 
Conclusion  
The common practice of exporting costly and complex biocontainment facilities and standards 
is not sustainable.  Concerns about sustained biosafety and proliferation of capabilities that 
could be misused require careful consideration. The proposed alternative framework for a safer, 
more secure and sustainable laboratory capacity building can guide capacity building according 
to local needs (local) with an emphasis on relationship and trust-building (people) and 
continuous outcome and impact measurement (make sense). This generic framework can and 
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should serve as a blueprint for international policy decision-making on improving biosafety 
and biosecurity in laboratory capacity building.  
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V. Evaluation framework for public health interventions 
MAKING SENSE OF COMMUNICATION INTERVENTIONS IN PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCIES – an evaluation framework for risk communication25 
 
Abstract 
Introduction: Communication interventions during public health emergencies are 
acknowledged as a determinant of success in preparedness, response and recovery. However, 
there is little evidence on the impact of communication interventions upon the dynamics of 
public health emergencies to guide capacity development.  
Hypothesis: This article proposes a new evaluative framework built on the hypothesis that 
impact is measureable through the evaluation of identifiable performance parameters related 
to the dynamics of an outbreak. The assumption is that risk communication interventions that 
lead to earlier detection, faster response, smoother coordination and a smarter legacy lead to 
lower morbidity and mortality (reduced AUCepidemic curve).  
Method: This new evaluation framework for risk communication measures the relation 
between a baseline dynamic of epidemic and communication activities and the changed 
dynamic resulting from risk communication activities.  
Conclusion: A better understanding of how the two dynamics relate can lead to a better 
management of future public health emergencies.  
 
Keywords: Risk communication, Measurement, Evaluation, Infectious Diseases, Preparedness 
planning, Infectious Disease Management, Public Health Interventions 
 
Introduction 
The public health imperative during an outbreak of an infectious disease is to control the event 
as quickly as possible in order to protect health and minimize the loss of life and disruption 
caused by an epidemic.1 The opportunity for rapid control of outbreaks is most effective if the 
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outbreak is detected early and appropriate responses are initiated quickly.2 Communication, 
social mobilization and the early sharing of information have been found to play a critical role 
in prevention and preparedness, outbreak control and recovery.3 Infectious disease prevention 
and control need to be fast, flexible and effective. Delays in information sharing, 
miscommunication and/or misinterpretation between those affected, response staff and 
volunteers, public health officials, policy makers, and businesses can affect health, livelihoods 
and economic stability.4,5 The current outbreak of Ebola virus in West Africa underlines the 
importance and complexities of communicating at all levels: between international and national 
agencies, national and local health authorities and community-based organizations, front line 
health workers and affected population, and affected communities themselves.6 Slow and 
poorly coordinated international and national responses, weak surveillance and reporting 
systems, low provider knowledge and capacity, lack of sensitivity to local beliefs, norms and 
values, poor engagement with affected populations, and low levels of trust in authorities and 
experts are some of the communication related difficulties identified.7,8  
Communication activities related to epidemic outbreaks work best when they build on a 
comprehensive understanding of infectious disease risks among and between health officials, 
affected or vulnerable communities and the general public. Risk communication activities are 
aimed at identifying, describing, analysing, addressing and adopting the behavioural, 
knowledge and attitudinal factors that underpin the more efficient and effective management 
of infectious disease risks.9 Those responsible for preparing, preventing and responding to an 
outbreak need to understand the socio-cultural perceptions, views and practices of those at risk 
of harm from the public health hazard and work in a way that builds and maintains trust. Trust 
is seen as a fundamental component of outbreak control across cultures.3  
Institutionalised risk communication capacities and systems help prepare for crisis 
management and in so doing build capacity for needed understanding of infectious disease 
risks and related behaviours. This capacity building is vital both for peaks in demand and public 
health emergencies, and also for managing continuous health threats, such as measles outbreaks 
and antimicrobial resistance.10  
However, while the importance of risk communication in public health interventions is 
increasingly acknowledged and embraced e.g. as a core capacity in the WHO IHR 2005, no 
standardized measurement tools have been agreed to evaluate the impact of risk 
communication activities upon unfolding infectious disease emergencies and continuous 
threats. Our measurement hypothesis aims to contribute to the development of an evaluation 
framework that addresses a broader conceptualisation of risk communication activities 
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including planning, preparedness, response and recovery phases. Without tools to evaluate the 
impact of risk communication it is not possible to make evidence-based recommendations for 
good practise or justify investments.11-13  
 
 
A new approach to risk communication in public health 
Researchers have used before and after measures, various models and data sources to estimate 
how much difference in awareness, choice and behavioural patterns, a given risk 
communication intervention has made for a particular outbreak.14-16 These measurements have 
been built on approaches to risk communication that mainly focussed on the need to find the 
right way to tell people what to do in times of a crisis. Such approaches are important, but do 
not reflect current thinking and concerns about the limitations of just focussing on uni-
directional, hierarchical information conveyance from health officials to the public.9,17 Risk 
communication is now understood as a more interactive, holistic, continuous and engaging 
activity that focuses on dialogue, intelligence gathering, building relationships over time, a 
knowledge base informed by new and accessible communication technologies (e.g., social 
media and networks), and supportive environments. Risk communication is now viewed more 
broadly and includes information, communication and coordination activities.10,18  
Information 
Information activities include but are not limited to intelligence gathering, assessing 
and sharing. Importantly, this also includes listening capacity through formative 
research (focus groups, interviews, questionnaires), media monitoring, public opinion 
polls, networking, use of media- traditional and social, surveillance and laboratory 
diagnostic systems. 
Communication 
Communication activities include but are not limited to content development (key 
messages), segmentation approaches (strategy) and delivery methods (channels and 
spokespeople). This also includes relationship building, dealing with uncertainty, 
building trust, transparency, engagement strategies and consultation.  
Coordination 
Coordination activities include but are not limited to partnership and inter-sectoral 
working, ensuring congruent messaging, internal communications and collective 
endorsements. Coordination takes place on different geographical and organisational 
levels and includes developing supportive environments, e.g., developing health 
literacy friendly organisations and communities; - aligning literacy demands with skills 
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of users; providing navigational assistance in complex systems; and use of community 
champions. 
Box 1: Risk communication - key terms and their working definitions 
 
A Risk communication matrix 
To take account of this conceptual shift in the understanding of risk communication, a new 
measurement approach is proposed which has a broader activity focus than just information 
transfer and communication of risks. The new approach looks at three main activity areas of 
risk communication across the lifecycle of an epidemic. These activity areas include:  
! Listening and gathering insights, assessing and sharing: e.g. monitoring social media chats 
or performing formative research to better understand perceptions, attitudes, knowledge 
and behaviours of vulnerable and other populations; 
! Communicating and engaging: e.g. making reliable, up-to-date information available and 
accessible; selecting appropriate trust-worthy communicators, platforms and channels for 
distribution of information; integrating key stakeholders into planning and dissemination 
activities; and   
! Coordinating, supporting and reviewing: e.g. building and supporting on-going 
relationships with stakeholders and partners; monitoring and evaluating performance 
parameters and adjusting practise based on learning.   
Risk communication activities BEFORE  
a public health 
emergency 
 
PREPAREDNESS 
BEGINNING  
a public health 
emergency  
 
DETECTION/ALERT 
DURING  
a public health 
emergency 
 
RESPONSE 
AFTER  
a public 
health 
emergency 
RECOVERY 
Informing 
 
Listening 
Gathering  
 
   
Assessing 
 
 
 
   
Sharing     
 
Communicating 
 
Relationship 
building 
Communications 
(actions: flyer, 
website, etc.) 
  Crisis 
communication 
 
Key messages / 
Content 
    
 
Strategy / 
Methods 
    
 
Coordinating 
 
Supportive 
environments  
  
District      
Regional     
National     
International     
Figure 1: Matrix of risk communication typology [adopted from 10] 
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Figure 1 creates a matrix of risk communication typology that focuses on these three activity 
areas and can be used to help structure evaluative thinking related to these activities during the 
key phases of public health emergencies and could serve as a template or resource for planning. 
It also places crisis communication within the matrix of risk communication activities and 
helps identify the more limited focus of crisis communication and its positioning in the 
spectrum of risk communication activities.11    
 
An evaluation hypothesis  
Building on this activity matrix, it is hypothesised that an effective measurement approach 
should help to better understand if and how risk communication interventions affect the 
dynamic of a public health infectious disease emergency; for example, an outbreak.  
 
The epidemic and communication curves  
To understand how this might work, it is useful to compare typical epidemic and 
communication related curves in the lifecycle of an epidemic (see Figure 2 where the curves 
are used as models for illustration purposes).  
 
 
Figure 2: Normal distribution of epidemic curve and communication curve  
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Communication interventions usually come in when the epidemic outbreak is detected by 
surveillance and response interventions and outbreak control measures are triggered and 
implemented. Four key performance parameters are identified.  
First, in the routine epidemic situation, there is a time lag between the onset of the outbreak 
and its detection (1) and the activation of communication activities for response (2). Thirdly, 
it usually takes a while until the outbreak is reported to national and international level (e.g., 
WHO under IHR or ECDC under EU legislation) in order to comply with national and 
international health regulations, request further assistance in the management of an epidemic 
outbreak and/or coordinate the national and international response (3). The post-epidemic 
recovery period provides another key performance parameter. In this period lessons, often 
neglected, could be learned that lead to better preparedness and improved response for future 
epidemic outbreaks. We call this leaving a “legacy” because we see this as a process that uses 
learning to build knowledge and response capacity in the community and health systems to 
improve performance. This is the fourth performance parameter (3). This could, for example, 
refer to new and or improved processes and systems that may be established by specific teams 
in managing epidemics and emerging diseases outbreaks that consequently become 
sustainable, institutionalized and used by subsequent/future teams.  
 
 
Figure 3: Key performance areas  
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Hypothesis  
The proposed measurement approach focuses on the relation between a baseline dynamic of 
epidemic activities and communication activities and the changed dynamic resulting from risk 
communication activities. Performance parameters are identified that could eventually be 
measured by their impact on better case management, lower infection attack rate, fewer cases, 
fewer deaths, increased compliance, etc. The overall goal and long-term outcome is that 
improved communication interventions will lead to improved management of public health 
events and a reduction of morbidity and mortality (reduced AUCepidemic). (Figure 4) 
 
 
Figure 4: Improved communication may have a positive impact on the course of the epidemic 
(hypothesized) 
 
Evaluating communication activities: Four key performance parameters 
This proposed approach to the evaluation of risk communication activities draws on a new 
understanding of risk communication and measures the relationship(s) between the dynamic of 
the epidemic or incident and the dynamic of communication and social mobilization 
interventions that reflect risk communication response capacity.  
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For an initial core conceptual framework we focus on four key performance parameters that 
can be described as:  
! EARLIER (1): reducing the time lag between onset of outbreak and its detection by 
getting closer to and more engaged with the community and the infectious activities on 
the ground 
! FASTER (2): reducing the time lag between detection and response activities  
! SMOOTHER (3): better coordination of national and international response activities  
! SMARTER (4): feeding back to improve decision-making and response in the current 
event and leaving a legacy to improve preparedness, control, response and recovery for 
future outbreaks 
 
 
Figure 5: Key performance areas EARLIER, FASTER, SMOOTHER, SMARTER 
 
EARLIER 
All activities, conditions and factors in the areas of information, communication and 
coordination that lead to earlier detection, such as closer relationship with communities, 
improved first detector capacity, trust in reporting cases, listening to rumours, etc.  
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FASTER 
All activities, conditions and factors in the areas of information, communication and 
coordination that lead to faster response, such as reducing the time from realisation of 
an outbreak to initiating response by having trusted information and communication 
networks, trained and knowledgeable workforce, existing communication between 
communities and health professionals.  
SMOOTHER 
All activities, conditions and factors in the areas of information, communication and 
coordination that lead to smoother coordination, such as better collaboration between 
sectors, trusted information sharing and communication between different 
administrative levels, better link between national and international response 
approaches.  
SMARTER 
All activities, conditions and factors in the areas of information, communication and 
coordination that lead to smarter legacy, such as a feedback mechanisms to enable and 
encourage learning from previous events, improved information sharing and 
communication for better decision making, more resilient communities, etc.  
Box 2: Key performance areas – key terms and working definitions 
 
Measurement approach: process and outcome measurement 
Aiming to assess impact, researchers in the fields of social sciences, e.g. communication 
interventions, are often faced with the attribution problem: a positive impact, e.g. fewer death 
or a lower mortality, cannot be attributed to – for example – a specific communication 
intervention programme that promotes the adoption of risk–reducing behaviour, because of 
confounding factors that may have contributed to the desired impact.  
This measurement framework suggests a different approach: it can be used for process and 
outcome measurement. The four key performance areas can be used in a process evaluation to 
monitor and assess how risk activities (see Figure 1) have changed. Risk communication 
process measurement, for example, could focus on the “how” of risk communication 
interventions, e.g. how the risk communication is being performed. Key questions here could 
include: is this risk communication activity aimed at getting closer to communities; how does 
it do it? (The ‘how’ question elucidates context-sensitive indicators to be used in the 
measurement).   
This conceptual framework can also be used to measure outcomes of risk communication 
interventions and their impact on performance (“EARLIER”, “FASTER”, “SMOOTHER” and 
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“SMARTER”.) in the activity areas of information, communication and coordination (Figure 
1). For example, in the performance area of “EARLIER” and “FASTER”, risk communication 
information gathering interventions could be aimed at creating a new or better link with a 
community group that shares information related to its “listening” to community concerns and 
beliefs on a regular basis. Better engagement with such community groups could result in 
earlier recognition of an event and faster reporting. Earlier detection and faster reporting could 
be facilitated because people are more aware, comfortable to report and know better whom to 
contact in case they detect anything unusual. An outcome measurement using the key 
performance areas could measure a change in outcome before and after a risk communication 
intervention programme. This is why this measurement framework uses comparatives for its 
performance areas (“EARLIER”, etc.). These changed outcomes can indicate how they 
contribute to the desired impact. 
Similarly, “SMOOTHER” could relate to better coordination between sectoral departments and 
“SMARTER” to evidence showing that relevant processes and systems have been changed 
based on learning.   
 
Modelling – Understanding the relation between the two dynamics 
While the measurement of changes in the relation between two dynamics seems rational, the 
key challenge in this approach is how to translate risk communication activities into 
measurable data. For this purpose, historic events, such as past outbreak data (e.g. Cholera 
outbreak in Sierra Leone 2012), can be used to pilot a first categorisation of risk communication 
activities (outputs) e.g. number of household visits, information campaigns, number of 
volunteers, on-going and ad hoc activities in the countries, etc. into the typology of risk 
communication activities (Figure 1) and understand how these activities lead to changed 
outcomes: earlier detection, faster response, smoother coordination and a smarter legacy. These 
historic events are well documented by international aid agencies and could form a starting 
point to look at risk communication activities in the context of different disease outbreaks (such 
as Cholera, Ebola) in different geographic settings. Risk communication could then be 
combined with formal mathematical models of infectious disease outbreaks to better 
understand the two dynamics. A variety of other, equally well-documented outbreaks, e.g. 
current Ebola outbreak in West Africa, could be used to develop the tools for this measurement 
approach as well. 
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Perspective 
There is no internationally agreed approach to the measurement of public health 
communication interventions in the context of infectious disease emergencies. Researchers and 
practitioners work hard to improve emergency response and justify investments.  
If and how public health communication interventions affect the epidemic course is still under-
researched and how approaches are selected still tends to be somewhat intuitive. In order to 
move towards the ability to reliably measure impact of risk communication interventions our 
proposed framework provides a system that can contribute to a better understanding on how 
risk communication interventions contribute to changing key performance parameters that can 
be associated with reductions in deaths and illness.  
We believe that the key performance area “SMARTER” deserves more attention as it is often 
neglected in processes that predominantly focus on improving detection and response. 
“SMARTER” performance includes both the capacity to feedback, in real-time; lessons being 
learned from an on going outbreak to improve decision-making and communication; and 
inform and improve, based on new knowledge and experience gained, future preparedness, 
prevention, response and recovery from other health events. Such “SMARTER” processes and 
outcomes leave a “legacy” that can give communities a greater ability to cope and strengthen 
their resilience for future health risk.  
The analytical approach now being proposed has been developed to better understand the 
dynamics of public health interventions in different socio-cultural settings. Research has now 
to focus on gaining a better understanding of this contextual relationship. We believe that 
applying our measurement approach will be helpful to such research endeavours. We 
recommend the use of this framework in any analytic research setting exploring the impact of 
risk communication interventions. The recent Ebola outbreak seems like an obvious starting 
point as the learning curve about the importance of communication and community 
engagement seems very steep.    
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VI. Case Study: EBOLA 
USING LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS EBOLA OUTBREAKS TO INFORM 
CURRENT RISK MANAGEMENT26 
 
Connecting Organizations for Regional Disease Surveillance (CORDS), together with the 
Southern African Centre for Infectious Disease Surveillance, organized an emergency meeting 
(September 1–2, 2014, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania) to gather and collate first-hand experience 
from past Ebola outbreaks. The major aim was to identify key lessons that could inform current 
risk management. This meeting brought together a unique assembly consisting of scientists, 
policymakers, community and religious leaders, traditional healers, and media representatives 
from eastern and central Africa. They elucidated 3 major lessons that focus on improving 
communication, working with communities, and building and strengthening local capacity. 
 
Communication: Work with Communities, Not against Them 
A major conclusion was that infectious disease management will work only when it is 
established with and within the community and not directed against it. This lesson requires 
community engagement in formulating infection control measures, as well as implementation, 
dissemination, and promotion of these measures. Infection control procedures are generally 
perceived as intrusive and, as such, often interfere with local social, cultural, and religious 
practices. For instance, the recommendation to avoid physical contact with a sick person is 
simply outside the behavioural norms in most communities. For example, from a community 
perspective, “protect yourself when caring for a sick person” would be a more suitable 
recommendation and a better alternative than a recommendation to avoid all physical contact. 
Building on this process of finding the right, appropriate containment measures, 
communication and health promotion work best when they involve community and religious 
leaders, traditional healers, and other advocates. 
National and cross-border Ebola outbreaks are a new development, and engagement with 
various communities has presented a particular challenge throughout the current outbreak. A 
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key aspect of this engagement is to devise and elaborate solutions for infection control that are 
consistent with local realities and practices. International health and aid organizations must 
strive to work in concert with communities to find adequate infection-control solutions. 
 
Communication: Share Early, Listen to Beliefs, and Read Rumours 
Early sharing of information and surveillance data among professional groups was considered 
to lead to clear benefits. The countries of central and eastern Africa learned from previous 
outbreaks, and they have established infectious disease surveillance networks that operate in 
cross-border regions. Training in risk communication and One Health promote early 
communication among neighbouring professionals across sectors and with the public. Multi-
sectoral collaboration is key to early detection and faster response. 
The risk communication approach also encourages public health professionals to engage with 
their communities to gain a better understanding of community values, opinions, and beliefs. 
For instance, a major lesson involved burial practices: participants explained that for local 
persons, a traditional burial is more essential than protecting themselves from an infectious 
disease they have not yet encountered. Therefore, the well-intended infection control messages 
went unheeded because they were not perceived to be relevant to completing a sacred ritual. 
Traditional burial practices can hardly be stopped through the imposition of infection control 
measures (“Don’t touch/wash”), but they could be made safer by integrating protective steps 
into the rituals, such as using gloves and burying the deceased rapidly. International 
organizations might need to redesign their communication strategy to prioritize the 
communities’ needs, not their own requirements. 
Communities have their own communication networks, and rumours spread fast and are 
influential. Regarding infectious disease, there are 2 kinds of rumours: 1) about possible cases 
(alerts) and 2) about community explanations of causes. Rumours distract from (compete with) 
the health message. Outcomes from this meeting suggest reframing rumours as useful guidance 
similar to pain, rumours provide often uncomfortable but useful feedback. The 2 main types of 
rumours are useful indicators to for 1) guiding case detection and 2) understanding where 
communication efforts go wrong. This reframing might enable health experts to detect cases 
earlier and to more effectively communicate with the public; it could also encourage a 
discourse about unusual disease events within communities. 
Speaking from experience, public health experts advised communication specialists to consider 
using a case alert rumor book to provide alarm signals for quick response and follow-up 
response. In addition, a rumor book could serve as a record of the community explanations of 
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infectious disease transmission and, as such, might help establish a starting point for 
community engagement. For instance, a common rumour was that Ebola is caused by 
witchcraft; the conventional response is to refer to Ebola as a virus. However, more useful 
would be to accept this alternative explanation and create recommendations consistent with 
community mind-set (e.g., don’t touch this person unprotected, but provide food [and prayers] 
as a token of empathy). 
 
Capacity Building: Avoid Blind Spots by Addressing the First Detectors 
Cases typically appear before medical attention is sought and thus before cases can be 
understood as useful signals that trigger the activation of response. The initial detections of 
cases as alarm signals in a community represent the “blind spots” of capacity building: 1) 
capacity building on local level is often for health professionals, and 2) capacity building 
addresses a response mechanism (first responder training). Avoiding blind spots means shifting 
capacity building from reactive response to proactive detection involving the community. 
Awareness raising and capacity building capacity at local levels must be continuous. For these 
purposes, a variety of training is now offered (World Health Organization and Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention safety training). CORDS has designed an Intensified 
Preparedness Programme that offers short-term crisis response and longer term capacity 
building, consisting of training, advice, and background material for infectious disease 
management for affected and not-yet affected countries. 
 
Conclusions 
The massive influx of international support addresses the foundational weaknesses of the 
public health systems. A key impairing factor, the engagement and communication with the 
community, is probably not yet addressed properly. The lessons learned in previous outbreaks 
identify major drivers of infection control as local realities and can advise the revision of the 
international response strategy with a focus on community engagement, communication, and 
capacity building. Effective community engagement during risk communication is a necessary 
and often underrated strategy to build trust and confidence for community health security and 
thereby global health security. 
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VII. Risk communication put in practice: EARLIER detection 
DRIVERS FOR EARLIER DETECTION – a systematic literature review27 
 
Abstract  
Background: Early detection of infectious disease outbreaks can reduce the ultimate size of the 
outbreak with lower overall morbidity and mortality due to the disease. Numerous approaches 
exist with the aim of detecting outbreaks earlier, and methods have been developed to measure 
progress on timeliness. Understanding why these surveillance approaches work and don’t work 
will elucidate key drivers of early detection, and can guide interventions to achieve earlier 
detection. Without clarity about necessary conditions for earlier detection and their influencing 
factors, attempts to improve surveillance will be ad-hoc and unsystematic. 
Methods: We conducted a systematic review using the PRISMA framework to identify 
research published January 1, 1990 - December 31, 2015 in English language. MEDLINE 
(PubMed) database was searched. Influencing factors were organized according to a generic 
five-step infectious disease detection model. 
Results: Five studies were identified and included in the review. These studies evaluated the 
effect of electronic-based reporting on detection timeliness, impact of laboratory agreements 
on timeliness, and barriers to notification by general practitioners. Findings were categorized 
as conditions necessary for earlier detection or factors that influence whether or not these 
conditions can be in place, and organized according to the detection model. There is some 
evidence on reporting, no evidence on assessment, and a speculation about local level 
recognition.  
Conclusion: Despite significant investments to detect outbreaks early, there is very little 
evidence with respect to factors that influence earlier detection. To guide intervention planning, 
more research is needed.   
 
Keywords: Infectious Disease Outbreaks, Public Health Surveillance, Disease Notification, 
Time Factors 
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Background 
Infectious disease outbreaks can spread rapidly, causing enormous losses to individual health, 
national economies, and social wellbeing.[1-6] Through early detection of an infectious disease 
outbreak, a small outbreak can potentially be contained at the local level, thereby reducing 
adverse impacts.[7-11] Early detection has been and remains the current narrative of infectious 
disease surveillance.  
 
A variety of surveillance approaches exist with the aim of detecting early, many of these 
following advances in technology. Traditional indicator based surveillance (IBS), e.g. 
mandatory disease-specific notification, laboratory surveillance, and syndromic surveillance, 
has been complemented by event based surveillance (EBS) that gathers and analyzes 
information from drivers, formal or informal,[12, 13] in order to broaden the scope of surveillance 
to an all hazard approach as requested by International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) and 
with the aim to detect outbreaks earlier and faster using new technologies. 
 
Over the last decade, there has been substantial investment in the development and operation 
of surveillance systems that use existing health data both formal and ad hoc—from sources 
such as emergency department visits and sales of pharmaceuticals—to provide immediate 
analysis and feedback to those charged with investigating potential outbreaks.[14] New digital 
data streams for infectious disease surveillance have risen from developments in information 
communication technology,[15] such as early adopters ProMED-mail and Global Public Health 
Intelligence Network (GPHIN), and more recently, numerous openly available news 
aggregators and visualization tools.[16] Diagnostics have progressed as a result of scientific 
developments, leading to automation and highly multiplexed assays and advances in point-of-
care testing, making sample collection and testing possible in remote settings.[17] 
 
Innovative governance structures have been established to promote early detection. Disease 
surveillance networks have formed, such as the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Global 
Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), combining human and technical resources 
around the world to rapidly identify, confirm, and respond to outbreaks. Cross-border regional 
disease surveillance networks have been established across the globe, connecting 
epidemiologists, scientists, ministry officials, health workers, border officers, and community 
members to engage in activities, such as training, capacity-building, and multidisciplinary 
research.[18] Agreements have been instituted setting legal mandates around surveillance 
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activities, such as the IHR (2005), which calls for all WHO Member States to build, improve, 
and strengthen their capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases outbreaks 
that can have global spread.[19] 
 
The proliferation of zoonotic diseases has demonstrated that the timely identification of future 
emerging microbial threats requires an integrated international approach to disease 
surveillance. Programs working at the human-animal interface employ many of the same 
techniques as human health, such as the Global Avian Influenza Network for Surveillance 
(GAINS) that trains individuals and organizations to collect samples, and disseminates lab 
results through an open-access electronic database.[7]  
 
The list of novel strategies described above is not exhaustive, yet demonstrates the breadth and 
intricacy of surveillance approaches aiming to detect outbreaks early. These approaches work 
in concert with generic infectious disease surveillance activities, which remain essential to 
public health practice, particularly at the local level.[7] Together, these approaches ultimately 
aim to decrease the impact of outbreaks on populations. (Figure 1).   
 
 
 
Generic infectious disease surveillance follows a multi-level public health model, where a case 
or an event first must be recognized as unusual, and then reported and assessed (as a signal). If 
the case or event meets criteria for further notification, it is reported to higher level authorities 
and subsequent assessment/investigation ensues. This detection process can be categorized into 
the following five generic steps: 1) Recognition (of a case or an event); 2) Low level reporting; 
3) Low level assessment; 4) Higher level reporting; and 5) Higher level assessment (when 
!
!
157 
outbreak declaration occurs). While the key players involved at each step will vary by 
region/country and disease, the basic structure is the same. Inputs into the system include 
human and animal health events, risks (indicating a potential outbreak), and data. 
 
Novel approaches link up with the generic five-step model at different stages. For example, 
alarms from syndromic surveillance input into the system as risk (of a potential outbreak), and 
ProMED-mail and GPHIN provide new data into the system. Both must be followed-up with 
an epidemiological investigation to determine if and what public health response is needed. 
Diagnostic tools aid in the assessment steps, and agreements and networks reinforce the entire 
system by building and strengthening overall capacity for carrying out surveillance activities.  
 
Given the enormous amounts of time and money invested, measuring impact is a priority. There 
have been a number of analyses that aim to quantitatively measure (in days) the timeliness of 
infectious disease surveillance systems, seeking to answer the question of how effective these 
interventions have been.[20-23] Additionally, the IHR (2005), Global Health Security Agenda 
(GHSA), and U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) present useful 
frameworks for evaluating infectious disease surveillance systems, including timeliness of 
disease detection.[24-26]  
 
Measuring change in timeliness can help us to hypothesize about effective approaches; 
however, it doesn’t provide information about the causal mechanisms at play. Understanding 
why these surveillance approaches work and don’t work will elucidate key drivers of early 
detection, and enable us to refine and design interventions for earlier detection. The important 
question becomes: Why do certain approaches/interventions lead to early detection? 
 
Leading organizations have offered guidelines on how early detection can be achieved. For 
example, the CDC Working Group produced a prominent guide that is useful and consistent 
with the landscape of approaches currently operating.[27] However, the recommendations are 
broad and it is unclear if they are based on evidence.  
 
In this paper, we systematically review the peer-reviewed literature to identify what evidence 
exists about factors that influence earlier detection of infectious disease outbreaks. This review 
focuses on the generic public health surveillance infrastructure and includes inputs that novel 
approaches generate, i.e. risks and data. The goals of this review are to i) synthesize what is 
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currently known and ii) identify gaps and limitations that can be addressed by future research 
efforts. Understanding the evidence-base of influencing factors could guide approaches to 
achieve earlier detection.  
 
Methods 
Search Strategy and Selection Criteria 
We conducted a systematic review using the PRISMA framework to identify research, 
published between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2015 in English language, answering 
either of the following questions: (1) What are the factors that (a) facilitate earlier disease 
detection and (b) block earlier disease detection? (2) How can we measure if these factors 
contribute to an earlier detection time?  
 
Our research question focuses on the drivers of earlier detection and how these facilitating or 
blocking factors can be measured. Our research focus determines our review selection. The 
following inclusion criteria were used: any study design; study outcomes include timeliness of 
event-based infectious disease surveillance (time from event to outbreak realization); 
measurement of outcomes are quantitative or qualitative; study objectives include 
identification of factors that influence timeliness of infectious disease surveillance or 
evaluation of interventions targeting specific influencing factors; events of interest include 
human, animal, data, or risks; and factors must be modifiable, i.e. amenable to intervention 
considering the research focus on how influencing factors can be measured. Any studies not 
meeting all of the above inclusion criteria were excluded.  
 
In addition, the following exclusion criteria were used: surveillance of non-communicable 
diseases; syndromic surveillance; active surveillance; and individual case detection. Grey 
literature and perspective pieces were not included in this review.  
 
MEDLINE (PubMed) was searched using the following terms: (Disease notification[mesh] OR 
Population surveillance[mesh] OR Public health surveillance[mesh] OR surveillance[Title]) 
AND (Time factors[mesh] OR Timeliness[Title] OR Timelier[Title] OR Time[Title] OR 
early[Title] OR earlier[Title] OR evaluation[Title] OR evaluating[Title]) AND (Disease 
outbreaks[Title] OR Infectious disease[Title] OR infectious diseases[Title]).  
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Study Selection 
Two independent reviewers appraised each title and abstract for relevance according to the pre-
determined inclusion/exclusion criteria. The inter-reviewer agreement rate was 70% (see 
additional material). Reviewers resolved disagreements by discussion. Full articles were 
obtained for all papers included after this first screen. One researcher screened the full texts 
applying the inclusion/exclusion criteria to determine eligibility. 
 
Using a standardized form, one researcher extracted data from each eligible study. Data 
extracted included study characteristics, methodology, intervention or surveillance system 
details, study aim(s), study outcome(s), and influencing factors. The researcher determined 
whether or not the influencing factors identified in the study were based on evidence or 
speculation. If they were based on speculation, they were excluded from the review. 
Influencing factors were extracted manually and organized according to the five-step disease 
detection model. 
 
 
Figure 2: PRISMA diagram 
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Results 
Descriptions of the Studies 
The search identified five studies.[22, 28-31] Table 1 summarizes the studies in terms of 
general characteristics.  
 
Table 1: Summary of studies 
 
Study Outcomes 
Four of the five studies evaluated the effect of electronic-based reporting on detection 
timeliness. [22, 29-31] These studies were conducted in the United States and the Netherlands, and 
each defined outcome intervals of interest in days. Of the two studies conducted in the United 
States, one looked at the time interval between the date/time that the automatic electronic 
laboratory-based system notification was generated at the hospital and the date/time that the 
laboratory result was reported to county health department by the conventional paper-based 
system.[28] The other U.S. study assessed the time from symptom onset to county health 
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department case notification.[31] Of the two studies that examined electronic reporting 
timeliness in the Netherlands, one looked at the time intervals of symptom to municipal 
notification, and laboratory diagnosis to municipal notification,[22] and the other at the intervals 
between symptom onset and national notification, and municipal and national notification.[30]  
 
The Australian study examined barriers to notification of infectious diseases by general 
practitioners and identified strategies for improving the notification process.[29] One of the 
Dutch studies, in addition to measuring impact of different methods of reporting, also measured 
how the existence of physician-laboratory-Municipal Health Service agreements (that 
authorize direct reporting by one or more local laboratories) influence timeliness.[22] 
Our search did not result in more specific publications revealing evidence on drivers of earlier 
infectious disease outbreak detection.  
 
Findings of the Studies 
Reijn et al. had the following findings: the presence of physician-laboratory-Municipal Health 
Service agreements showed a significant reduction in notification time to the Municipal Health 
Service by 5.3 days (p < 0.01; 95% CI 1.7-8.9 days), compared to Municipal Health Service 
without agreements for reporting of hepatitis B in 2008; Municipal Health Service, which 
received most reports by fax, showed an average improvement in notification time of 3.3 days 
(p < 0.05; 95% CI 0.5-6.1 days) compared to Municipal Health Service which received reports 
by post; e-mail was slower than fax, though not significantly, and showed no significant 
improvement compared to post; and Municipal Health Services receiving 10-20 report cards 
per week from physicians showed a significant delay of an average of 19.1 days for lab 
diagnosis to Municipal Health Service report, compared to other Municipal Health Services 
with an average of 7.3 days for lab diagnosis to Municipal Health Service report. The authors 
conclude that an increase in direct and immediate laboratory reporting of diagnoses to 
Municipal Health Service would improve timeliness, and that physicians and laboratories were 
not aware of the importance of rapidly reporting cases.[22] 
 
Panackal et al. found that electronic alerts were reported a median of 4 days (interquartile range 
4 days) sooner than through paper-based reporting.[28] 
 
Ward et al. found that the overall median central delay (defined as time between regional and 
national reporting) was reduced from 10 days (interquartile range 4) in 2001 with a paper-based 
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reporting system to 1 day (interquartile range 1) in 2003 with an electronic system; and that, 
except for malaria, the total delay (defined as time between symptom onset and reporting at 
national level) was also significantly reduced with the electronic system.[30] The authors 
comment that astute clinicians remain important for timely reporting of certain notifiable 
diseases. 
 
Allen et al. found the following barriers to physician notification of cases: physicians expected 
that the laboratory would notify cases (and if doctors left notification to the laboratories, there 
was an increased delay of 7-19 days); physician uncertainty of diagnosis; lack of remuneration 
for notifying; notifying is time consuming; and poor specificity of clinical diagnosis or 
concerns about implications for the patient of notifying a disease later found to be incorrect.[29] 
  
The CDC report found that electronic laboratory reporting would reduce the total time from 
symptom onset to county health department notification of a case by nearly half for 
salmonellosis (from 12 days to 7 days) and shigellosis (from 10 days to 6 days), but would 
produce no change for meningococcal disease (4 days) and minimal improvement for hepatitis 
A (from 13 days to 10 days).[31] 
 
Analysis of the Findings 
We categorized the findings as conditions necessary for earlier detection or factors that 
influence whether or not these conditions can be in place. Then, we organized the conditions 
and influencing factors according to the five generic steps in the disease detection model. One 
study also speculated on factors that may contribute to earlier detection, which is included (and 
indicated) in the presentation below. (Table 2) 
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Table 2 Analysis of studies 
 
Discussion 
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The evidence-base of necessary conditions and influencing factors for earlier detection 
identified in this review is sparse. There is some evidence related to reporting (at the low and 
higher levels), no evidence about influencers of assessment (at the low or higher levels), and 
only a speculation about recognition at the local level. This limited evidence is surprising given 
the large and growing size of the field focusing on early detection.  
 
Recognition 
Evidence is missing in the area that could perhaps lead to the most improvements in detection 
timeliness. Local recognition is a critical first intervention area that can enable the detection of 
an epidemic in its early stage. Epidemics generally begin in small, local areas, and then 
subsequently spread more widely. While recognition is the earliest possible point for 
intervention, there is no evidence as to what factors influence earlier detection at this step.  
 
Low level reporting 
Low level reporting has the most evidence. A main finding is that electronic reporting is faster 
than paper-based reporting. This is the low-hanging fruit of early detection. It is intuitive that 
electronic-based systems will be timelier than paper-based systems. This does not discount the 
importance of having this evidence, however, it would be helpful to further explore this to 
understand the factors that influence whether or not these technical capacities can be in place. 
For example, available financing would certainly influence whether or not information 
technology structures can be in place. Perhaps a policy or national-level agreement would also 
be influencers. These types of factors are amenable to intervention, and could facilitate the 
implementation of electronic-based reporting. 
 
The Reijn et al. findings suggest that establishing reporting agreements, implementing a fax-
based reporting system, and raising awareness of the importance of rapidly reporting cases are 
worthwhile areas for intervention for earlier detection in The Netherlands.[22] The Allen et al. 
findings of barriers to reporting relate to physician beliefs and attitudes, so trainings and 
educational seminars might seem like effective interventions.[29] However, by understanding 
why physicians have the beliefs and attitudes that they do can enable us to intervene further 
upstream and better target the root causes.  
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Low & higher level assessment  
Low and higher level assessment are complex steps that can involve many players, often across 
multiple sectors (especially if the pathogen is zoonotic, which the majority of emerging 
pathogens are[32]). Assessment at the low level might involve physicians, veterinarians, or 
community health workers depending on the region and disease scenario. If the input into the 
system is data or risk (for example, if information is picked up via a rumour book or online 
media story), this might involve local public health, animal health, and/or laboratories. Higher 
level assessment might involve district, regional, or national public and animal health, and 
laboratories. Vertical and horizontal communications and coordination are required to carry 
out assessment activities, including down to the community level. These stages are very 
complex, and perhaps require the most in-depth thinking.  There is currently no evidence on 
key drivers of earlier detection during assessment.  
 
Higher level reporting 
Evidence suggests that information technology needs to be in place for higher level reporting 
to contribute to earlier detection. Higher level reporting can involve any notification following 
the initial assessment of an event, data, or risk. For example, the Ward et al. study assessed 
regional to national level reporting, and the CDC paper focused on laboratory to county level 
reporting.[30] Both of these reports occur after the initial reports are sent by physicians to the 
laboratory and, perhaps also, to some district public health authority. The exact flow of 
notification relies on the disease and context. Both of these studies found that information 
technology is a necessary condition for earlier detection. Similar to low level reporting, 
research should build on this to understand the factors that influence whether or not these 
technical capacities can be in place.  
 
Recommendations 
To guide effective interventions and investments for early detection, more research is needed 
to build evidence on what factors influence earlier detection. EBS was introduced to 
complement IBS, but for both surveillance systems, it is unclear what leads to earlier detection. 
Research should consider all steps in the disease detection process, from recognition of a case, 
an event or risks and data (indicating a potential outbreak), to outbreak declaration. 
Understanding if and how the various surveillance activities can contribute to earlier detection 
can enable proper prioritization to achieve maximum impact. Event recognition is the earliest 
possible point for intervention, and there is currently no evidence as to what factors influence 
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earlier detection at this step. Low and higher level assessment also lack evidence and are 
potentially the most complex steps, and can involve participation across sectors and national 
boundaries. These activities should not be ignored. 
 
The studies included cover a range of geographic regions and pathogens. Needs and challenges 
will differ across regions and diseases. To ensure utility of findings, studies should focus on 
regions that are homogenous with respect to factors that could influence earlier detection, such 
as infrastructure, governance, environmental vulnerability to infectious disease, surveillance 
systems, and resources. Additionally, the existing evidence comes from the northern 
hemisphere. Many low income countries—where most of the global population resides—lack 
the resources or infrastructure to support such activities, and are most at risk for epidemic 
events.[32] Research should specifically address necessary conditions and influencing factors in 
these vulnerable regions.  
 
The Reijn et al. and Allen et al. studies measured the contributions of influencing factors to 
earlier detection, albeit partially. (Allen et al. only measured one of the five influencing factors 
identified.)[29] The other studies only identified necessary conditions, so were unable measure 
contributions of upstream factors. Being able to quantify impact of factors on earlier detection 
can enable balancing of costs and benefits, aid in intervention prioritization, and maximize 
social return on investments. This will be an important component for future research in this 
area. 
 
Transparent, replicable, and flexible methodologies can promote development of earlier 
detection frameworks for different regions. Using similar systematic methodologies for 
developing evidence can also enable comparisons and potential synergies across and between 
regions. Pathogens don’t respect borders, so frameworks that build on one another could 
protect against future regional or global outbreaks. We suggest the generic five-step 
surveillance structure as a model, as it can be applied to any context for any infectious disease 
scenario. 
 
Outbreak management extends beyond the role of public health, and often requires 
communication and coordination across multiple sectors and countries. For example, detection 
of zoonotic infectious diseases requires horizontal interaction between the agencies, 
departments and ministries responsible for public health, medical professions, veterinary 
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services, and the environment.[33] Vertical interaction is also crucial for outbreak detection. As 
outbreaks start in communities, involving community members in this early phase could yield 
important information.  
 
Limitations 
This review was restricted to the MEDLINE database. This database is one of the largest and 
most well regarded biomedical databases available, indexing thousands of high-impact 
journals. Like any database, though, its coverage is not complete and varies according to the 
field. Because MEDLINE is the most widely used database in the medical sciences, we decided 
that restricting to MEDLINE was a sufficient search strategy given existing time constraints. 
 
Grey literature and perspective pieces were not included in the review. Given the size of the 
field, there is likely much written in the grey literature on how to detect early. However, of the 
guides and frameworks that we found, it was unclear what evidence, if any, these were based 
on. We decided to limit our review to the peer-reviewed scientific literature to only capture 
evidence, and not speculation. 
 
Our review rationale was determined by our research focus to reveal factors that influence 
earlier detection and ways to measure their impacts. We did not compare different surveillance 
systems and data collection methods with each other. Thus, our review base was very small. 
This could indicate that our selection rationale was too strict; or that there is a gap of evidence 
that can guide improvement of surveillance methods leading to ad hoc decisions on what and 
how to improve and speed up detection.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite significant investments to detect diseases earlier, there is very little evidence on factors 
that influence earlier detection and measurement of these factors. An evidence-base of the 
influencing factors can enable more targeted intervention planning. More effective 
interventions can lead to earlier detection of infectious disease outbreaks, and ultimately, 
decreased impacts of epidemics on populations. More research is needed on evidence-based 
factors that influence earlier detection. 
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